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Given  Turkey's already  extensive  trade liberalization,  a move  to
uniform  external  incentives  would  bring  most  of the benefits  of
full trade liberalization.  Moreover, it is not enough to have
piecemeal  reform  of tariffs  or  export  subsidies  alone.  Harmoniz-
ing Turkey's already  low tariffs to the European  Community's
tariff structure  will improve  Turkey's welfare  only if Turkey  at
the same time removes or reduces its export subsidies.
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Turkey undertook a major liberalization of trade  1985 level (about twice the 1989 level of the authors'
policy in the 1980s. Import quotas have virtually  benchmark model) - which reintroduces an anti-
disappeared, the Turkish lira was made convertible,  export bias. In this case, piecemeal tariff reduction to
and tariffs are gene.rally  lower. Those changes and the  the 1989 level is beneficial.
export subsidies that remain have, on the whole,
removed the anti-export bias from Turkey's external  In Turkey, even small export subsidies are not
incentive regime.  always be,neficial, despite the rule of thumb that small
export subsidies are a welfare-enhancing offset to the
Using a 40-sector computable general equilib-  anti-export bias of import tariffs. Why? Because
rium model, Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr consider  export subsidies in Turkey are highly dispersed, and
several more trade liberalization options available to  piecemeal reductions in the export subsidies reduce
the Turkish govemmenL They conclude that unifor-  that dispersion. When the authors counterfactually
mity of tariffs and export subsidies would substan-  impose uniformity of tariffs and export subsidies,
tially improve Turkey's welfare.  they resurrect the rule of thumb that small export
subsidies are beneficial as a piecemeal policy for
Although the "Ramsey" optimal import taxation  offsetting the anti-export bias.
would call for non-uniform import taxes inversely
proportional to the elasticity of import demand in each  Policymakers in developing countries have
sector, the observed dispersion of the tariff structure in  occasionally applied export subsidies in individual
Turkey is inconsistent with optimal departures from  sectors with high tariffs as a means of encouraging
uniform protection. In fact, in Turkey uniformity  exports in a sector that may otherwise rely only on the
achieves an extremely high proportion of the benefits of  highly protected domestic market. The authors show
full trade liberalization  because, in the absence of a  that in Turkey high export subsidies in sectors with
general anti-export bias, the principal distortion remain-  high tariffs are particularly counterproductive -
ing in the trade regime derives from dispersion of the  because at the multisector level the distortion intro-
tariff and (especially the) export subsidy structure.  duced by the export subsidy (by encouraging  too
many resources into the protected sector) dominates
Like Turkey, an increasing number of developing  the reduction in the overall anti-export bias.
countries - including Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, and
Poland - have in recent years undertaken extensive  Turkey's proposed policy of harmonizing its
trade liberalization. It is no longer clear that these  tariff to the European Community's  common external
economies retain an anti-export bias in their trade  tariff would yield only small welfare changes, which
regime. Perhaps the most important policy conclusion  would be small losses as the European Community
the authors reach is that one must be wary of advocat-  interprets harmonization. Why?  Because harmoniz-
ing piecemeal reform of tariffs or export subsidies  ing to EC tariffs will require lowering Turkish tariffs
alone. In Turkey, piecemeal across-the-board tariff  from already low levels, in the presence of export
reductions do not always improve welfare; they must  subsidies almost as large as the existing averagc
generally be coordinated with reductions in export  effective tariff rate. But harmonizing to the EC tariff
subsidies to ensure improved welfare. The authors  structure can be beneficial if at the same time export
counterfactually assume that Turkey's tariffs are at the  subsidies are removed or reduced.
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Turkey has undertaken  a major liberalization  of trade policies in the decade of the 1980's. Import quotas
are virtually non-existent,  the Turkish lira has been made convertible, and tariffs have generally bven lowered so
that the average nominal tariff rate is less than 10 percent. Given these changes and remaining export subsidies,
Turkey has on average removed  the anti-export  bias from its external incentive regime.
The impact  on Turkey of its import-substitution  trade policies in the 1970's and of its trade liberalization
in the early 1980's has been the subject  of a number  of earlier studies, notably Baysan [1984], Baysan  and Blitzer
[  1988; 19911,  Rodrik  [  1988b]  and Grais, de Melo  and Urata [19861.  We take as our point  of departure the relatively
liberal  trade regime  of Turkey  in the late 1980's, and, employing  a 40 sector computable  general equilibrium  model,
consider several further trade liberalization  options  that are now open to the Turkish government. The first option
is the principal trade policy change Turkey is planning  to implement:  harmonization  of the tariff structure  to the
common external tariff of the European Communities  (EC). This option is part of Turkey's effort to continue  to
press its case for membership  in the EC. The second  option is for Turkey to completely  remove all trade barriers,
including  import tariffs and export subsidies. The third option is the adoption  of a uniform protection structure,
removing the sectoral dispersion of nominal tariffs and export subsidies. The final option is to consider sectoral
liberalizations  of tariffs or export subsidies. We present a formal quantitative  model that allows an evaluation  of
the effects of these options.
The first conclusion that we draw from our analysis is that tariff and export subsidy uniformity  yields
substantial  benefits  in welfare terms for Turkey. Although 'Ramsey'  optimal  import taxation would call for non-
uniform import taxation inversely proportional to the elasticity of import demand in each sector, the observed
dispersion  of the tariff structure in Turkey is inconsistent  with optimal  departures frotn uniform protection.  In fact,
in the case of Turkey uniformity  achieves  an extremely  high proportion of the benefits of full trade liberalization.
This result is explained  primarily by the substantial  trade liberalization  Turkey has undertaken  during the decade
of the 1980's. Given the prevailing  export subsidies  and low level of import protection, the trade regime  no longerhas a general anti-export bias. The principal distortion  remaining  in the trade regime derives from the dispersion
of the tariff and export subsidy structure, especially  the latter.
The evaluation  of removal of trade barriers yields what is perhaps our most important  finding: first best
rules-of-thumb  that may be appropriate  for highly  distorted  economies  need not be appropriate  for economies  that
have liberalized as much as Turkey. In particular, piecemeal across-the-board  tariff reductions are not always
beneficial from a welfare perspective,  and generally  must be coordinated  with export subsidy  reductions  in order
to ensure welfare gains. If we counterfactually  assume that the tariff level of Turkey is at the level of 1985  (about
twice  the 1989  level of our benchmark  model),  this reintroduces  an anti-export  bias in the external incentive  regime.
In this case piecemeal  tariff reduction  to the 1989  tariff level is beneficial. Moreover, in the case of lurkey, even
small  export subsidies  are not always  beneficial,  despite  the rule-of-thumb  that small export subsidies  are a welfare
enhancing  offset to the anti-export  bias of import tariffs. The reason is that export subsidies  in Turkey are highly
dispersed. so that piecemeal  reductions  in the export subsidies are beneficial because  the dispersion is reduced  as
a result. We show  that if we counterfactually  impose  uniformity  of export subsidies  and the tariffs, the rule-of-thumb
that small export subsidies are beneficial  as a piecemeal  policy for offsetting  the anti-export  bias of the tariff is
resurrected.
As Turkey turned away from import substitution  in the early 1980's, it adopted strong export promotion
measures. Few would object to the stongest measures  it took in swithching  incentives  toward exports, namely the
reduction  in high import barriers and real exchange  rate depreciation.  However, the more direct export incentives
(such as budgetary transfers)  have been the subject of controversy  regarding their effectiveness  and their welfare
effects.  I During the last half of the 1980's, however, direct export incentives  have also been reduced. In order to
assess  whether there  were benefits  of the export subsidy  reduction,  we counterfactually  scale up all export subsidies
so that the average export subsidy is at the higher level of 1985 (as well as some other years), and simulate the
effects  of the Turkish  policy  of lowering  export subsidies  toward  the level of 1989.  Starting  from the level  of import
protection of  1989, this tilts the external incentives toward export promotion and,  more importantly, greatly
'See Milanovic  119861,  Rodrik f1988al  and Arslan  and van Wijnbergen  (19901  for discussions  of the expont  incentive  progam and
estimation  of its effectiveness  in encouraging  exports.  These studies, however,  did not asse  the welfare  effects of the export  incentives.
-2  -increases the dispersion in the export subsidies  as well; then the policy of export subsidy reduction  yields very
substantial  welfare benefits.
Like Turkey, in recent years an increasing number of developing countries, such as Mexico, Chile,
Indonesia  and Poland, have  undertaken  extensive  trade liberalization.  It is no longer  clear that  these economies  retain
an anti-export bias in their trade regime. Our results show that in such cases one must be wary about advocating
piecemeal  reform of tariffs or export subsidies  alone.
Policy-makers  in developing  countries have  occasionally  applied  export subsidies  in individual  sectors  with
high tariffs as a means of encoutaging exports in a sector that may otherwise rely only on the highly protected
domestic market. We show that this policy is particularly  counterproductive,  because  at the multisector  level the
distortion that the export subsidy adds by encouraging  too many resources  into the protected sector dominates  the
reduction  in the overall anti-export  bias.
Another important policy  conclusion  that we draw is that the EC harmonization  strategy is significantly
inferior to any of the other strategies. Our examination  of the policy of harmonizing  the Turkish tariff to the
common extemal tariff of the EC shows that there are generally small welfare changes involved. 2 This result
follows  simply from the fact that harmonization  to EC tariffs will require a lowering  of Turkish tariffs from already
low levels, in the presence of export subsidies  almost as large as the existing  average effective  tariff rate. Beyond
small reductions in the tariff, the export subsidies  become the dominant distortion to the trade regime, and the
economy becomes  too export oriented. We argue, however, that harmonization  to the EC  tariff structure  can be
a welfare enhancing  policy if accompanied  by a policy of removing or reducing export subsidies. The important
policy lesson for Turkey from this exercise is that if it intends  to proceed with harmonization  to the EC common
external tariff, it is important to accompany  that policy  with a reduction  in export subsidies.
The model  that we use is deliberately  very  simple, to facilitate  the confrontation  of policy-makers'  intuition
with easily interpreted simulations.  The model assumes  no terms-of-trade  effects, a single household, no capital
accumulation,  and constant returns to scale production  with competitive  pricing. In work in progress we examine
2 For  small  reductions  in the  tariff, which  was  Turkey's  interpretation  of harnonization,  there  are  small  welfarm  gains. For  larger  tariff
reductions,  which  is the  interpretation  of the  EC, there  are  small  welfare  losses.
-3-in detail the implications  of relaxing some of these assumptions  in the present model. We readily concede that
relaxing these  assumptions  could alter our conclusions,  but they would not facilitate  our assessment  of the rules-of-
thumb in a clean and simple environment.
An important component  of any practical trade liberalization  package is the way in which the revenue
effects of the policy are treated. We exploit  the ability of a 'simulation laboratory"  to control for these effects by
adopting  an explicit  replacement  tax such that government  revenue remains  constant. We allow the value addJ.d  tax
or a lump-sum  tax serve as replacement  taxes for any changes in revenue. In the absence of any other changes in
policy  the first tax effects distortionary  replacements,  whereas  the lump-sum  tax is non-distortionary  in our model
(there is no labor-leisure  choice). In the case of Turkey  we find that the value added tax is an excellent 'real-world'
alternative to the theorists' lump-sum  replacement  tax, in the sense that it has a relatively  small marginal excess
burden for the range of revenue  replacements  required here.
In Section 2 we outline the model that has been developed, including  the procedures used to empirically
estimate  the model to the Turkish economy using 1985 input-output  data and 1989 protection data. 3 In Section  3
we report the results  of our policy simulations.  Finally, in Section  4 we draw our conclusions  for policy.
2. A SMALL OPEN ECONOMfY  MODEL
2.1 General Model Structure
Our Small Open Economy (SOE) model is designed for trade policy analysis with a large number of
sectors. The model is a "generic' general equilibrium  model  of a single economy along the lines of de Melo and
Tarr [  19921.  The distinguishing  feature  of the model  is that it effects a simple closure with respect to foreign  tmade
such that the economy  experiences  no terms-of-trade  effects.
3 Formal  details of the algebraic  structure are presented  in Appendix  A. Appendices  B and C provide additional  details about  recent
developments  in the tade regime in Turkey and the specific  estimates  used in our model.
-4-Goods are produced using primary factors and intermediate  inputs. Primarv factors include labor and
capital. 4 In export sectors a composite  output is produced  which  distinguishes  between  goods destined  for domestic
and export markets. This trade-off  is characterized  by a constant  elasticity of transformation  frontier. Production
may either exhibit  constant, uicreasing  or decreasing  returns  to scale. When there  are constant  or decreasing  returns,
producers behave competitively,  selecting output levels such that marginal cost at those output levels equals the
given market price. In the present version of the model we assume constant  returns to scale in production  for all
sectors.
Final demand by private households  arises from nested constant  elasticity  of substitution  utility functions.
At the first level imported  goods trade off with corresponding  domestic  products,  with possibly  different  elasticities
of substitution  by commodity.  At the top level different  types of goods enter in a constant  elasticity  aggregate.  All
income elasticities  are unity.
Five types of trade distortions  are included  in the model: (i) ad valorem tariffs (or subsidies)  on imports,
(ii) ad valorem export subsidies, (iii) non-tariff barriers in the form of fixed, tariff-equivalent  ad valoren price
wedges,  (iv) import  quotas,  and (v) voluntary  export restraints. Tariff revenues  and export subsidy  payments  appear
in the government  budget,  while all rents from NTBs, import quotas  and VERs are returned  lump-sum  to domestic
consumers.
5
In order to capture the erfects of geographically  discriminatory  protection  policies we allow imports  and
exports to bear different tariffs  or subsidies  depending  on their source or destination.  This feature allows  us to study
policies  such as harmonization  or accession to a free trade area, albeit in the absence of any terms-of-trade  effects.
Imports from different  sources substitute  with each other at a lower nest in utility to form a composite  import good
for each sector which enters the top-level  of the utility function.
Govenunent  expenditures  and investment  demand  are exogenous.  Funding  of government  expenditures  is
provided  by net tax revenues.  There are three other components  of government  income in addition  to import tariffs
4 7be  general  model hiucture accommodates  additional factors  such as land (for agricultural preduction), rcsources  (for  xtractive
industries), or sector-specific capital (in the Ricardo-Viner tradition).
5  Tere  is no rent-disipation, so the model  only measures  the distoftion cost of trade restrictions.  Thus our welfare  measues  neglect
rent-seeking  losus if any are present.
-5-and export subsidies. These are (i) value-added  taxes on factor inputs to production, (ii) ad valorem production
subsidies  or excise  taxes  on production  output,  and (iii) lump-sum  taxes on domestic  consumers.  In a counter-factual
scenario one or more of the tax inst: 'nents adjusts  endogenously  to balance  government  (net) tax revenues with
expenditures.  This equal-yield  constraint  is accommodated  through -i endogenous  proportional  adjustment  of value-
added tax rates or lump-sum  transfers. Thus the welfare  effects of changes in trade policy explicitly  incorporate  the
appropriate  marginal  excess burden  of raising  government  revenue from other sources.
Demand functions are uncompensated,  so Walras law guarantees that the value of private consumption
equals the income from primary factors, taxes, and import and export quota rents. Public consumption  is balanced
with the value of public endowments  and tax revenue.
World market import and export prices are given, and there are no endogenous  changes in the terms of
trade. In other words, import supplies and export demand  are infinitely elastic. The current account balances  the
value  of exports and imports taking into account  exogenously-specified  capital inflows.
2.2 The Turkish SOE Model
The SOE model is relatively  easy to implement  empirically.  One requires a consistent set of Input-Output
accounts or a  Social Accounting Matrix showing the  standard intermediate, final demand and  value added
transactions. Additional  estir-itts of tariff rates, tax rates, or subsidy  rates may also be needed, depending  on the
detail of the Input-Output  database. Estimates of elasticities must be assembled for primary factor substitution,
import demand, import source, domestic demand, and the transformation  of domestic supply into domestic and
exported  products. 6
We employ a  1985 Input-Output table distinguishing  64 production sectors. 7 We aggregate this to 40
sectors, selecting to aggregate the smallest 24 sectors which account for only 5.1  % of the value-added  of the
6 In detail, these  elasticities  refer to the elasticity of substitution  between  primary factors of production in each sector, the elstieity  of
substitution  between  domestic  production  and an imports composite  in each sector, the elasticity of substitution  between  imports
distinguished  by source, also by sector, the elasticity  of substitution  between  domestic  consumption  of each good (the components  of which
are, in tum, composites  of domestic  and imported production); and the elasticity  of tmnsformation  of domestic  production into domestic
uses  and export.
7 This is the latest Input-Output  table available  for Turkey as of late 1990.
-6  -Table  1: Sectors  and Policies in the Turkish  Model (percentages)
1985  1989  Epo  P
ID  5ecr  Turif  Tarifls  Subskid  VAT  Subsidhj
AGR  Avictiltm  4.1  6.0  0.9  4.2
AIR  Air Trm  u  2.3
ALC  Alic  Bewetps  22D  ?23  8.2  4.7
ANI  ArWl  Hu  Yam1,  15.6  6.0  0.9
APP  WeJ_  83  Z8  13.5  1a
PLD  Bu1M1d Ca..ut,rtK  .Ih,
CEM  Ca  3.9  2.6  18.0  7.5
CUM  Other Chmmi  Prcdiu  19.8  15.?  13.7  11.4  2.4
COL  Coal MhIns  0.7  0.7  7.0  3.4
COM  C  K  n  2.S  6.3  2.1  2.0
CON  Otbcf C,uut__  4.5
ELE  El  iy  3.6  2.0
EIM  Ekria]  Macdicry  35.3  11.0  29.7  9.4
FAR  Fabhritad Metsl  Prmhxu  46.4  10.0  69.7  12.8
FIN  F  _uaI  _outWoJm  A  - w.w  9.7
FIS  F'ilr  23.5  34.9  0.)
FOR  FoiY uy  M0.5  3.9  1.1
FRT  Fatiliur,  1.3  2.5  IS.?  2.5  0.9
GAS  Gas MondetWm  & W*wvrb  3A
G15  Glum  a  Glas pudu  63.0  31.8  169  5.2
1914  ImI &  Sil  16.3  4.6  21.4  20.I
LND  Otbor Land  Tmnport  3.6
MAC  Mety  exo  Eleeta]  20.2  10.5  9.6  6.0  0.6
MEA  MNW  Prosig,  13.7  4.2  8.2  1.8
OFP  MmdXacw  or Oftr  Food  Pra]uet  33.7  30.1  8.2  15.0
OMP  Other NrlueliIc  Miurul  P  rou=tm  27.1  32.5  9.5
OWN  OwulbJp  of DwUlw  2.0
mPS  P  cados  &  Pwokeeiawl  servi  0.6  18.9
PUBX  Fkbllo ScrXce
REF  PeFko  RdtJin  150.7  16.2  15.7
RES  Rutamw  &  Howls  9.2
RUB  Rbr  Prxducu  49.8  25.3  2D.0  7.7
SWJ  SuW  16.9  32.3  2  8.4  9.0
TEX  Texdls  26.2  19.4  13.5  14.1
TOO  Toboo  52.1  57.3  2.4
TRD  Wholeal  Retil  Tn  10.5
VEG  Vgube  St  AniniJ  Oib A Fau  2.9  3.9  8.2  12.1  0.6
VEH  Mawv  ebka  &  Equps  . 24.6  3D.1  15.1  25.8
WAT  Water Tramput  _2,  . . 3  2S
_  _-  _  _  _  __  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  112.8L|  36 WOO,  Wood &  cork  Product  23.0  13.7  1.6  1.
-7-economy in 1985.  Given that one of the trade policy  options that we seek to evaluate  is protection  uniformity,  we
were anxious not to bias results by aggregating  the model  excessively. 8 Table I displays  the names of each of our
sectors along with a 3-letter acronym for later reference.
In Table 1 we also list  each of the tax instrumenis  in the Turkish model. Domestic  taxes  consist  of the value
added tax (VAT) and production  subsidies. 9 Foreign trade taxes consist  of import tariffs and export subsidies.  The
most important  instruments from a revenue perspective  are tariffs and the VAT. There are no import quotas or
voluntary  export restraints  (VER's) in the Turkey model, reflecting  their virtual  absence  from the economy  in 1989,
the benchmark  year for the tax and trade policies.
Using benchmark  import and export shares as weights the average import tariff in the model is 8.115%
and the average export subsidy  7.399%. These values are substantially  lower than prevailed throughout  the earlier
part of the 1980's. Nonetheless,  there is still considerable  dispersion in these  rates across  sectors, which turns out
to be crucial for our welfare evaluation  of their distortionary  effects.  0
The benchmark  values  of all elasticities  in the model  are reported  in an appendix.  Virtually  all of the values
have been selected from literature searches.  1 'Tere  are many elasticities that must be specified  here that we do
not have (good) data on. Our  remedy  for this problem, which is endemic to any large-scale  model  of this kind,
s By aggregating  even further (at least according  to the criteria of value-added)  we would tend to bias the model towards showing
smaller  welfare benefits  from uniformity, since  benchmark  tariffs would be more uniform in the benchmark  equilibrium solely as an artifawt
of the process  of aggregation.  One alternative  to employing  a disaggregated  model such  as ours, which would reduce  aggregation  bias, is to
use  an explicit decision-theoretic  metric in selecting  sectors  to be aggregated,  such  as advocated  by Harrison and Manning 119871.  This
would involve aggregating  tectors  with similar levels  of protection. Given that the current state  of modelling technology  does not constrain
us  to aggregate  significantly, we elect not to.
9  The VAT rstes listed in Table I show a great deal of variation across  sectors.  Patt of the reason  is there is some  slight statutory
difference  in the rates.  More important, however, is that our rates  are derived from observed  collections in 1985. the year  the VAT was
barely introduced.  Ther  were a great many  administrative  difficulties in collection procedures,  yielding differmnt  observed  collection rates.
Further claboration  is provided in appendix  B.
t° Moreover, just nine sectors  account  for 79% of the total tariff revenue:  CHM (20.7%), ELM (7.3 %), IRN (4.2%). MAC (13.4%),
OMI (5.2%), REF (6.1  %), TEX (4.5  %), TOB (3.  S%) and VEH (14.1  %).
II The elasticity  of transformation  is set at 2.9 in all sectors  and is based  on estimates  by Faini I19881; it has a standard  error of 1.3 in
our sensitivity analyses.  The primary factor substitution  clasticities  are based  on the regression  estimates  of Harrison, Jones,  Kimbell and
wrigle (19911,  and have standard  errors -s reported  ther.  They range  between  0.293 for refined  petrolcum products  (REF) up to 3.125 for
restaurants  and hotels (RES), but the  Sf-.  majority are close  to unity. The elasticity  of  substitution  between  domestic  and imported goods  is
based  on detailed  estimates  from the ORANI model of Australia reported  in Dixon, Pamenter, Sutton and Vincent (19821 There do exist
some  estimates  on these  elasticities  for Turkey, reported  in Grais, de Mclo and Urats (1986;  Table 5, p.
7S1, but these  were not sufficiently
disaggregated  for our purposes.  The import-source  substitution  elasticities  are set  at S on the basis  of our priors. Sinilarly,  the price
elasticity  of the Armnington  aggregate  is likewise set at 2 on the basis  of our priors. In addition there is an elasticity  of substitution  between
intcrmediate  inputs and  value-added  in each sector.  The tradition, no doubt borne  of Input-Output nodelling habits, is to set  this elsticity  at
zero. We do likewise, but also consider  values  of 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and I (for each  sector)  in our sensitivity analysis.  Apart from these  scctor-
specific elasticities.  there is one further elasticity reflecting  substitutability  of consumption  in the 'top-level'  of our consuners  utility
function. We assumc  a value of I in this instance,  again rflecting  our priorn and little hard evidence.
- 8 -is to undertake syatematic sensitivity analyses of our major results with respect to plausible bounds on  these
elasticities. Even if we are unable to specify  a point  estimate  with any precision, our priors over the likely  bounds
that these  elasticities  could take are quite strong. To the extent  that  our major conclusions  are robust  to perturbations
over these bounds, we do not see our uncertainty  over specific values of these elasticities as a weakness  of the
model. 12 We report the results of these sensitivity  analyses, which involve 1000 simulations for each counter-
factual policy, in Section, 5. They allow us to conclude  that our main results are robust, at least with respect to
plausible  uncertainty  over elasticities.
In the present  version of the model  we only have one private household  in Turkey. It is important  to note,
however, that there are several powerful  theorems  in international  trade theory to show that one can effect  Pareto-
efficient reforns for multiple  households  providing  there are aggregate (real) income gains and one accepts some
weak conditions  on pattems of demand  and ownership. 13 These results  do not rely on the availability  of lump-sum
redistributive  taxes, nor do they  address the issue of an optimal  reform package.  What they do show is that  one can
focus initially  on aggregate  gains in income  and welfare, knowing  that the redistributive  aspects  of the problem  do
have  a solution  that leaves  each household  at least as well off as before the reform. This is not a complete  substitute
for actually solving for the equity effects of a reform package, but it is a partial substitute. 14
The SOE  model  is generated  with  the GAMS  software  developed  by Brooke, Kendrick  and M.araus (  19881
and solved  with the MPS/GE software  developed  by Rutherford  [1989].'s
12  These remuark  should  not be interpreted  as denying  the value of any new  erprirical  work on generating  such  elasticities.  On the
contrary, any effon that could generate  better  bounds  on these  point estimates  is useful in generating  poficy conclusions  that carny  greater
credibility, even if those  conclusions  will  still be probabilistic in nature.
13  See Dixit and Nonnan (1980;  pp. 79/801  (19861.  The conditions on demand  and factor ownership  pattems  are primnarily  to rule out
'pure exchange'  economies.  These  conditions are trivially met in our mnodel.
14 It would be a relatively straightforward  matter  to extend  our model to acconmmodate  multiple households  if coresponding data  were
available.
15  The systenatic  sensitivity analyses  reported in an appendix  are undertaken  with the MPSS software implementing  the procedures
developed  by Harrison and Vinod [19921.
-9-3. POLICY ANALYSIS
We present our results by examining each of four trade policy options currently facing Turkey: uniformity,




A brief overview  of the literature  of uniformity will assist the  interpretation  of the results.  Import  taxes
are  an inefficient  method of generating  government revenue because they discriminate  between the domestic and
imported variety of the product,  and therefore distort consumption and production decisions. However,  it has been
known  at  least since  Ramsey  [ 19271 that  if one  is going  to utilize  import  taxes to generate  a  given amount of
revenue in an economy with only final goods, then that revenue can be generated with the least efficiency cost by
imposing tariffs in inverse proportion to the elasticity of import demand. That is, there are strong theoretical reasons
why non-uniform  tariffs may be optimal.
There are a number  of problems,  however, with implementing  Ramsey  optimal import taxes. First, when
there are intermediate goods included in the economy, or one accounts for cross-price elasticities, an extended
Ramsey  optimal import tax structure  still exists but its computation  is empirically  complicated.  More importantly,
practitioners  cf trade policy usually recommend tariff uniformity because the observed  pattern of  import taxation
in developing  countries often follows political economy considerations,  with cascading  protection for final goods,
rather than Ramsey optimal prescriptions.
Regarding non-discriminatory  domestic taxes,  it has been  shown that if all goods are  taxable and  labor
supply is perfectly inelastic, then uniform taxation is optimal for the purpose of raising a  given amount of
revenue.  16 Since a uniform tax on all goods is equivalent  to a tax on labor alone, a uniform tax will minirize
16 See  Atkinson  and  Stiglitz  [19801.
- 10  -distortion-induced  resource  movement if labor supply is perfectly inelastic. That  is, uniformity  is optimal because
agents cannot escape the tax by reallocating their production or consumption decisions.
Similarly, if labor supply is not perfectly inelastic then it becomes optimal to impose higher taxes on those
goods that are better complements  with leisure. 17 The tax on the good would include a component that is intended
to tax leisure. If there are other goods in the economy that cannot be taxed then the same logic would apply: higher
taxes should be applied on those goods that are complements with the aggregate of all goods that are not taxed. As
a  practical  matter  there  are  many  goods that  are  left  out  of  the  taxation  system,  with  varying  and  uncertain
complementarities to taxed goods, so it becomes very difficult to determine the optimal non-uniform tax.18 In our
model, however, there  is no labor-leisure choice and all goods are taxable.19 Therefore  we would expect that there
should be  welfare gains  from  movements towards uniformity of domestic  taxation. The only question reaining,
then. is how significant  they are quantitatively.
7 Assuming that leisurc cannot bc effectively taxed.
1I To illustrate,  consider  the simple  example posed by Harberger 119901  in which we consider extending a VAT to cover bicycle rpair
shops in the formal and hitherto  untaxed sector. By taxing this sector we will cause some substitution  towards other activities in the taxed
sector,  as well as some substitution  towards other untaxed activities such as the informal bicycle repair sector.  (There  may also be some
sectors whose outputs are net complements to  the output of the newly taxed sector,  but we can ignore those for present  purposes. In general
we  would expect that the output of the large groups  of sectors that we are talking about here,  the 'currently  taxed sector'  and the
*remsining  untaxed  sector', will be relatively  large and hence  net substitutes  with the output of the sector in question.)  Welfare  goes down
due to the loss in consumer  surplus  from the contraction  of the bicycle  repair shop, but will go up due to the gain in consumer  surpits  from
the expansion  in the other taxed and untaxed  sectors.  Which  effect  dominates?  The net effect  on welfare will  depend  on the degree  of
substitutability  between  the outputs of the newly  taxed sector  and untaxed  sectors. If there are sufriciently  strong substitutes  in the untaxed
sector, such  as informal  bicycle repair shops or personal  leisure  (i.e., seif-repair  as  a hobby),  then we would expect that net welfare  would
fall. The logic behind this conclusion  is the same as the Ramsey  Rule logic  which seeks to raise a given  amount  of revenue  with least
deadweight  efficiency  loss.  If adding a distontion  of a given  amount  on the formal  bicycle  repair sector generates  an arbitrarily  small
increment  in revenue  because everybody  substitutes  informal  repair services  that are completely  untaxed,  then one must keep increasing  the
distortion  until it is arbitrarily large so as to generate  the required  increment  in revenue. Such  large increases  in distortions  will eventually
ensure  a welfare  loss from the exercise,  even if the increment  in revenue is redistributed  in a lump-sum  manner  back to households.  Hatt&
and Haltiwanger  (19861  provide a succinct  formal  demonstration  of this result, providing  that we re-interpret  their lowest-taxed  activity  as
the newly  taxed activity  of this example.  Harberger  11990;  p.801  draws out the implications  for the practical  design of uniform taxation
schemes.
19  in the context  of international  trade and uniform  tariff policies,  the analogue  of 'untaxed activities' is smuggling.  To the extent  that
different  goods are easier to smuggle  one might  find that nominal  tariff uniformity  will have a non-uniformn  distortionary  effect (see
Panagariya  119901).
- 11-Results
Our results  for Turkey,  presented  in  Figure  1.  show  that  there  are  indeed  considerable  benefits  from
uniformity of  incentives in export subsidies and the external regime as a whole.
If uniformity  is limited to the tariff  regime 20 then benefits are  obtained  but they are  relatively modest.
Nonetheless,  the  result  verifies  the  intuition  of  practitioners:  the  actual  pattern  of  import  taxation  departs
significantly  from Ramsey optimal import taxes.21 When uniformity of external  incentives is extended  to include
export  subsidies 2,  the  benefits  of  uniformity  increase  dramatically  and  exceed  one  percent  of  GDP.  This  is
because there  is great  dispersion  in export  subsidy rates,  with many  sectors  receiving  no  incentive and others
receiving large  incentives to export  (see Table  1). When  we add  a  uniform  VAT and  production  subsidies23 to
uniform external  taxation  we increase the benefits further,  consistent  with the  fact that all goods  are taxable and
labor supply is perfectly  inelastic in our  model.
We demonstrate in the next section that the principal distortion  remaining in the external regime of Turkey
is the dispersion of  the incentives rather  than the level of the incentives.
3.2  Across-the-Board  Liberalization
Background
A number  of developing  countnes, including  Turkey, have progressively  liberalized  their import regimes.
Quantitative  restraints are  virtually elimunated and  tariffs have been  lowered,  but some  export subsidies remain.
Often the sectors with high tariffs are the same ones that have high export subsidies.  Although these countries stand
ready to reduce tariffs further,  in such a situation does it enhance welfare to continue  to reduce tariffs across-the-
board while leaving export subsidies in place? Conversely,  would it be beneficial to increase export subsidies as an
offset to the anti-export  bias of  the tariff,  as a second-best  measure  to reducing  the tariff?  We first consider  the
3D The uniform tariff is set at 8.115%,  which is the benchmark import-weighted average  tariff.  It is applied to all sectors, irrespective of
their trade status in the benchmark. Vintually identical results obtain if one applies it only to those sectors with benchmnark  imports or import
tariffs. The same generalization applies to the other unifornity  packages considered below.
21  If it did not depart  from the Ramsey optimal tax structure then uniformity would,  by definition,  imply welfare  losses.
22  The uniforn  level of export subsidies is  7.399%, which is again  based on trade-weighted  benchmark data.
3 The uniform VAT is 6.520%  and the uniform production subsidy is 0.730%.
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Figure 1: Welfare Effects of Uniformity  Policies
theory and conventional  policy advice  on this question in the context of the arguments for export subsidies.
The classic  argument  for export subsidies  rests on the theoretical  foundation  of the Leemer  [1936] symmetry
theorem,  which states that a tax on imports  is equivalent  to a tax on expcrts. It follows  that if a two-sector  economy
has an unremovable  import tax in the import competing sector it can offset the resulting  anti-export bias with an
export subsidy to the exporting sector.'  Based largely on this argument, Balassa [1987] argued that for most
developing  countries an anti-export  bias will likely prevail, even after tariff reduction  and devaluation,  which cails
for export promotion  measures.  Krueger [1984;  p.5281 noted that many 'export promotion" measures  employed  by
policy-makers  in developing  countries are nothing  more than partial offsets to the overall bias in the regime  toward
2 There are other theoretical  justifications  for export subsidies  that have been less important  in the policy debate. For example,  a
justification  for export subidies has been offered  by Itoh and Kiyono [19871, who argue that targeted export subsidies to  non-taditional
export sectors will enhance welfare when  additional  traditional exports of a country will suffer a tenns-of-trade  loss. In addition,  strategic
trade policy considerations  have been used to justify export subsidies,  for example by Brander and Spencer  [19851 as a method of shifting
profits in oligopolistie industries.  Eaton and Grossman (19861, however,  have shown that the arguments  for policy  intervention baed  on
oligopolistic profit shifting are not robust with respect to the specification of oligopolistic interaction.
- 13  -import substitution. Large export subsidies, however, generally create problems and  are  thus typically not
recommended.  These problems may include budgetary  problems for the government  and various types of rent-
seeking  behavior  such as falsification  of export documents,  lobbying to seek higher subsidy  rates, and export and
re-import  to obtain the subsidy.<'
Since export subsidies  per se in the manufacturing  sector are proscribed by the GAIT,  those who argue
for export subsidies suggest the use of export subsidies  that are legal under the GATT. Thus Balassa  [1987] has
recommended  that  developing  countries  rebate  import  duties and indirect  taxes  on exports, both to direct and indirect
exporters, as well as provide preferential export credit and export insurance  in the absence of private insurance.
These 'duty drawback' schemes  have the effect of automatically  linking tariff and tax reform with export subsidy
reform.
Results
Figure 2 displays the welfare effects of reducing  tariffs and export subsidies  across-the-board.  Reductions
of tariffs alone cause some welfare gains initial!y,  but these deteriorate into a welfare loss for reductions  greater
than 40%. This welfare loss is attributable  to the Lemer synunetry effect discussed  above. As the average tariff is
only slightly  above the average export subsidy, there is only a slight anti-export  bias in the external incentives. As
tariffs are progressively  reduced in a piecemeal  manner, the external incentives  eventually  become biased toward
exports.
25  Nogues f  19871  has  shown that in Argentiria expost  subsidies  lead to fraud, corruption and rent-seeking.  He concludes  that in Latin
America the level of import protection has been so donminant  that the provision  of fully offsetting subsidies  would introduce  budgetary
problems and rent-seeking behavior that would be counterproductive,  and is clearly inferior to the first best policy  of reducing  the imponrt
protection.  Based  on evidence  such as this. Thomas,  Nash and Associates [19911 have concluded that large expon  subsidies  are  not
recommended.
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Figure 2: Welfare Effects of Across-the-Board  Trade Liberalization
Figure 2 also displays the welfare effects of reducing  export subsidies  across-the-board.2  Contrary to the
case of tariff reductions, the benefits of export subsidy reductions  continue  up to a 70% reduction  and are much
more  substantial  at about one percent of GDP. The stark contrast  in the effects of export subsidy  reduction  and tariff
reduction  appears  at odds with the Lerner symmetry  theorem, since the average tariff and export subsidy  are about
equal. The puzzle is resolved by recognizing  that there is significantly  greater dispersion in benchmark export
subsidies.  As shown  above, the Turkish economy  would gain about one percent of GDP from uniformity  of export
subsidies,  but less  than 2/10 of a percent from tariff uniformity.  The process of taking  an across-the-board  reduction
" There has been some debate over  the claim that export subsidies in Turkey have an 'anti-agriculure'  bias. This  claim derives  fiom
the observation  that nominal  export subsidies  appear  to be concentated in manufacturing  industries  rather than agricultural  or food-related
sectors. It is a straightforward  matter  to test this claim  by looking  at the effects on domestic  output  when we remove  export subsidies.  In the
benchmark  year agricultural  industries  constituted  23.85  % of Turkish output. 'Agriculture  is here defined  as consisting  of AGR, ANI, FIS,
FOR, MEA, OFP, SUG, TOB, and VEG; this definition  errs on the side  of inclusiveness,  but more narrow definitions  would not change
our conclusions.  This value  trpands slightly when  we just remove export subsidies,  and expands  even further when we jointly  remove
expon subsidies  and tariffs. We therefore  conclude  that there is no evidence  of any general equilibrium  bias against agricultre due to export
subsidies.
- 15  -in export subsidies has the simultaneous  effect of also reducing  the dispersion in export subsidies, and it is the
reduction  in dispersion that is driving the result of Figure 2 for export subsidy reduction.
Reducing  export subsidies  and tariffs  jointly leads to even greater welfare gains than just reducing  export
subsidies.  This is again indicative  of the offsetting  effects of tariffs and export subsidies from the Lerner symmetry
theorem: large reductions  in tariffs result in welfare losses, whereas the effect of adding the same tariff reductions
to reductions  in export subsidies  is to enhance the welfare gains. 27 Removing  all domestic and foreign  distortions
results in further enhancements  of welfare, albeit not as large as those due to export subsidy removal.
To further bolster our interpretation  that the dispersion  in the export subsidy  regime is the principal  cause
of the gains from export subsidy reduction, Figure 3 addresses the question of export subsidy and tariff removal
again but with the difference that benchmark  tariffs and subsidies  are set equal to their uniform values. Thus we
eliminate  the dispersion in each before reducing  the level of the policy.
In this case the results are much more consistent  with the practical  rule-of-thumb  derived from the Lemer
symmetry  theorem. Recall that the benchmark  average tariff of 8.115 % is slightly higher than the average export
subsidy  of 7.3-99%,  resulting  in a slight  import-bias  in this new benchmark.  Any reductions  in export subsidies  result
in welfare losses that persist at the margin because  the regime becomes  biased further toward imports. There  is a
very slight welfare gain from reducing  tariffs by as much as 30%, with the maximal gain occuring at around the
10% level when imports tariffs just offset export subsidies  exactly. There are much larger welfare losses from
reductions  in tariffs by more than 30%. paralleling  the losses obtained from reducing export subsidies  alone. The
welfare effects of reducing the level of foreign distortions, given that they are  both initially uniform and
approximately  equal, are also negligible.  Recall from Figure I that  just making  foreign distortions  uniform results
in a welfare gain of 1.2%.
27  For  example,  consider  the 100%  reduction  in tariffs  and  subsidies.  Reducing  tariffa  alone  by 100%  results  in a welfare  loss  of
0.  125  %, whereas  reducing  expon  subsidies  alone  mults in a welfare  gain  of 1.004%.  The  implied  effect  of their  joint reduction  would  be  a
welfare  gain  of ondy  0.879%  (-  1.004-0.125)  if there  were  no interaction  term  and  their  welfare  effects  additive.  However  the  welfarf  gain
from  their  joint removal  is 1.  174%,  well above  the  1.004%  attributable  to export  subsidy  reductions  alone.  In other  words,  the  welfare  pin
from the  interaction  term  is 0.295  (  1.174-0.879)  in this  instance.  It is also  usefisl  to note  that  there  are  weak  second-best  constaints  on  the
reductions  in export  subsidies  and  foreign  distonions.  In the  case  of export  subsidies  the  optimal  reduction  is only 70%,  due  to other
distortions  remaining  in place.  Similarly,  reductions  in foreign  distortions  fail to generate  welfare  gpins at the  margin  when  they  reach  the
80%  level,  due  to the  presence  of domestic  distortions.  Only  when  all distortions  are  removed  do we find  that  the  optimal  policy  is to
reduce  them  by 100% as  expected  since  this is the  'first.best'  policy.
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Figure 3: Welfare Effects of Trade Liberalization  from Uniform  Initial Distortions
Uniformity  of external incentives  yields  almost  all the benefits  achieved  by removal  of both export  subsidies
and tariffs. The reason that uniformity  yields welfare benefits  almost as large as full liberalization  is explained  by
the fact that Turkey starts from a trade regime that is not significantly  biased toward import substitution  or export
promotion. During the 1980's Turkey  undertook  a significant  trade liberalization  which left it with a relatively  low
level of protection but a relatively  high level of export subsidies.  In other words, in our benchmark  equilibrium  it
has a structure of external incentives  that tends to be reutral with respect to either import substitution  or export
promotion.  The principal distortion  in the Turkish trade regime  is the dispersion in the incentives  across industries
and not, as is often the case in developing  countries,  an across-the-board  anti-export  bias. Ceteris  paribus, the more
the economy is protected and the greater the anti-export bias, the smaUler  will be the proportion of the welfare
benefits  of liberalization  that uniformity  will achieve.
- 17-We perform some additional expenments to verify this interpretation.  We benchmark our model to the tariff
rates prevailing in 1985, reported in Table  1. These were about double those applying in 1989, averaging  17.623%.
Although this tariff rate is somewhat small compared to rates of nominal protection in many developing countries,
it does introduce an anti-export bias into the Turkish external regime.  A piecemeal reduction in the 1985 tariff rates
to the level of  1989 results  in an increase in Turkish  welfare  of 7/100  of a percent  of GDP,  and  the benefits of
uniformity  (of all  distortions)  are  reduced  from  99.9  percent  to  94.1  percent  of  the  benefits  of  the  first-best
liberalization.  This  also  shows that  the tariff  reductions  that Turkey  undertook  in the  late  1980's were  welfare
enhancing.
If the  external  incentive regime  were  biased  toward  import  substitution,  as  is common  in developing
economrues,  then piecemeal lowenng of import protection would result in welfare improvement. The important lesson
is that when a country  has gone as  far as Turkey with  import liberalization,  while at the same  time maintaining
significant  export  subsidies,  further  import  liberalization  must  be  balanced  with  further  reductions  in  export
subsidies.28 Similarly,  these results provide support  for the  view that some small export subsidies are efficient if
a country starts  from an import regime that is significantly protected.
To the extent  that export or production subsidies in Turkey  are effected by means of  'duty  drawback'  on
customs duties on imports or VAT, interaction effects such as we have examined will be built in to any liberalization
of those subsidy schemes.  In other words,  anything that lowers tariffs would endogenously lower export subsidies,
generating these beneficial interaction effects. This may well be an unplanned advantage of the use of such drawback
schemes.
As Turkey turned away from import substitution in the early  1980's,  it adopted strong export promotion
measures, some of which,  as mentioned in the introduction,  have been the subject of controversy.  We also address
this issue by examining whether  the Turkish policy of reducing export subsidies during  the last half of the  1980's
was welfare  enhancing.  in  order  to  assess  whether  there  were  benefits  of  the  export  subsidy  reduction,  we
counterfactually scale up all e..port subsidies to levels estimnated  to prevail in earlier years in Turkey,  and simulate
8 Similar results  for the Polish economy  are discussed  by Tarr [ 19901. It was shown  that liberalization  of foreign cxchange  surender
requirements  would provide benefits  for Poland  for a very significant liberalization, but beyond  a high level of liberalization Polish welfare
would be reduced  unless  export subsidies  were also reduced.
- 18 -the effects of the Turkish policy of lowering export subsidies toward the level of 1989. This tilts the extemal
incentives  toward export promotion, but what is more important, greatly increases the dispersion in the export
subsidies. We find that the the policy  of export subsidy  reduction  yields very substantial  welfare benefits. 29
Finally  we note that second-best  effects  with domestic  taxes are apparent,  but they are not so important  as
to offset the benefits of either liberalization or uniformity as reform  packages providing they are applied to export
subsidies  (either  jointly with tariffs, or by themselves).
The Effect of Altermative  Tax Replacements
The use of  the VAT as a replacement tax makes virtually no difference  to our quantitative  or qualitative
conclusions.  The VAT has a relatively small welfare cost for changes in the order of  10% or  so, which is the upper
bound on most of the policy exercises we consider. Figure 4 displays these weifare changes,  using a lump-sum tax
to replace foregone revenues.  Thus we would not be surprised to see the use of the VAT having little effect relative
to the lump-sum replacement tax for reasonably small changes. Unless specified otherwise,  this is what we find in
all of our policy simulations.30
3.3 Sectoral Liberalization
We have seen above that given uniformnity,  export subsidies tend to offset the anti-export bias of tariffs even
in a multisector framework of the Turkish economy. Krueger [1984; p.528] has noted, however, that policy-makers
in developing  countries  have often  used  export  promotion  measures  as  a  device  to  induce  import  substitution
gWe perform  simulations with  three new expont subsidy rates of 2.0,  2.62  and 3.4  times the export subsidies of our original benchmark
equilibrium.  As discussed  in appendix  B, this corresponds to export subsidies of 14.8,  19.4 and 25.2 percent,  which were  reported as the
export subsidy rates prevailing in Turkey in the years 1988,  1985 and  1986, respectively.  As a percent of GDP,  the welfare  benefits of
reducing the export subsidies to the level of our original benchmarkequilibrium  are 3.6%,  6.5 % and 12.1%, with the higher welfare
benefits corresponding to reduction  of the higher  xpon  subsidies. The we.fare benefits of export subsidy reduction  increase  more  than
proponionately to the scalar multiple of the expon  subsidy, because the quantity of resources distorted  increases with the price distortion of
the subsidy and acts multiplicatively on the price  distortion in the calculation  of the welfare  costs.  Interestingly, the welfare effects of
subsidy reduction are only slightly affected by rebenchmarking with  1985 tariff rates,  reflecting the fact that it is dispersion  of the export
subsidy that is of prinary  importance in these results.
30 Although the welfare change from VAT reduction is small,  the sign of the welfare  change is the opposite of what is expected from
first-best policies.  This is because  VAT rates are  often high in those sectors that have high tariffs and export subsidies (we pursue this point
below).
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Figure 4: Welfare Effects of Reductions  in the VAT
industries  to export part of their output. Krueger  notes that this policy is also justified as offsetting  the anti-export
bias in the regime. Presumably  the argument  is that  the sector is not motivated  to export without  the export subsidy
since it receives  a relatively  high price on the domestic  market due to the import protection.
On the contrary, however, an export subsidy  to the sector that is also favored  by a high tariff will not be
an offset. Rather it will exacerbate  the resource misallocation  problem  of too mnany  resources  in the protected  sector.
We investigate  the impact on the Turkish economy of removing or reducing tariffs or export subsidies, or both,
from individual  sectors. Given piecemeal  policy  change in a particular sector, the interaction  with the VAT in the
sector will become impcrtant. In particular, if a sector enjoys a high tariff and high export subsidy, excessive
resource allocation  to the sector will be reduced  by a high VAT.
Table 2 presents a summary of welfare effects of piecemeal reform of individual sectors. In order to
compare results across sectors which are significantly  different in size, we express welfare gains here as a
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SUG  0.000537  0.000057  0-001614  0.00308  Ono.00S
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TOB  0  0.019122  0029122  0  0.052OMI
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by a marginal analysis. We do not report the TSX column for the marginal changes since the results would be
additive in the two components  that are displayed.
Given the policy concern mentioned  by Krueger, the first result on which we focus is the welfare effects
of export subsidy  and tariff reduction  in those sectors  for which  both the export subsidies  are greater than 15 percent
and tariffs are above average. From Table 1, there are six sectors in this group: Chemricals  (CHM), Electrical
Machinery  (ELM), Fabricated Metal Products  (FAB), Glass (GLS), Rubber Products  (RUB), and Motor Vehicles
and Equipment  (VEH). We see that  for a marginal  reduction  in export subsidies  in all sectors  except  Motor Vehicles
there is a welfare gain. Sirnilarly, for a marginal  reduction  in tariffs in all sectors  except Electrical Machinery  there
- 22 -is also a welfare gain.31  These results support the view that using high export subsidies in sectors with above
average tariffs is counterproductive. 32
Theory suggests that the distortion  costs of a tariff or subsidy increase more than proportionally  with the
size of the tariff or subsidy, because  the quantity  of resources  misallocated  also increases  and acts multiplicatively
on the tariff or subsidy  in calculating  the value  of the distortion  costs. Thus the benefits  of export subsidy  reduction
are greater at the margin the greater the export subsidy, and the concentration  of high export subsidies  in a few
sectors  in Turkey is likely to be a problem  for this reason. Examining  the three cases of export subsidies  above 20
percent, Fabricated  Metal Products  (FAB),  Iron and Steel (IRN), and Electrical  Machinery  (ELM), there  are indeed
substantial  benefits  from a reduction  of the export subsidy  at the mnargin,  even though  in the case of Iron and Steel
the tariff rate is below average. Thus the evidence for Turkey supports the view that high export subsidies are
counterproductive.
The same general policy  conclusion  also holds for those sectors with high tariffs. There are seven sectors
with tariffs in excess of 30% (ALC, FIS, GLS, OFP, OMP, SUG and TOB), and inspection  of Tables 2 and 3
verifies that the welfare gains from tariff reduction  in these sectors are substantial  at the margin.
There are many sectors for which there are welfare losses from reductions  in tariffs, export subsidies,  or
both, either in terms of marginal  or complete liberalization.  In addition there are a number of sectors for which
marginal  liberalization  can be beneficial in welfare terms and yet complete liberalization  harmful. With respect to
export subsidies,  examples  include Machinery  except  Electrical  (MAC), Meat Processing  (MEA), Textiles  (TEX),
and Vegetable  and Animal  Oils and Fats (VEG). With respect to tariffs we have MAC again, Other Non-metallic
Mineral Production  (OMP), TEX again, and VEH. These results are explained  by the fact that after some point
further reduction  of tariffs or export subsidies  results  in a bias in incentives  against the sector given that  tariffs and
exports subsidies remnain  in place in the rest of the economy.
31 Motor Vehicles experienced  the highest VAT rate  in the economy at 25.8%.  so export subsidies are offseting the impact of too little
resources in Motor Vehicles due to the VAT. In Electrical Machinery, there is also an above average VAT rate; moreover, the tariff rate,
which  is close to the averagc rate in the benchmark,  is also playing an offseting role to the VAT at the margin.
32 These results  are based only on Harberger  triangle-type  distortion costs. Including  considerations of rent-seeking, as mentioned
above, would strengthen the argument against high expon  subsidies.
- 23  -It is also inteesting  to note that the relationship  between these sector-by-sector  results and the earlier
across-the-board  results. Taking  simple  sumns  of the welfare  gains in Table 3 indicates  aggregate  gains  of 0.8% from
removing export subsidies, minus 0.14% from removing  tariffs, 0.7% from removing foreign distortions, 6.5%
from marginally  reducing export subsidies, and 0.05% from marginally  reducing tariffs. The first three of these
numbers compare with the actual welfare gains of across-the-board  reform of 1.0%, minus 0.12%, and 1.2%,
respectively. This indicates  that there are significant  interaction  effects from liberalizing foreign  distortions  on a
multi-sectoral  basis rather than implied by the sum of the individual  sectoral reforms: the welfare gain is roughly
doubled.
3.4 Harmonization with the European Communities
Background
Turkey has long held aspirations  of becoming a member of the EC. As part of negotiations  with the EC
on this matter Turkey has adopted a policy  of harmonizing  it's tariff structure  with the Common External Tariff
(CET) of the EC. There has been some dispute  as to exactly what this means, however.
Turkey's 'effective (nominal) tariff  consists of several components,  as discussed in Appendix B. First
there is a statutory  customs duty. Then there are a series of import surcharges, such as stamp taxes and wharf
charges. The customs  duty varies across sectors, but the surcharges  are generally  unif,orm.  We refer to the sum of
customs duty and these surcharges  as the 'total duty' to be applied to dutiable imports.
However, Turkey exempts  a significant  portion of imports from duties through a number  of mechanisms
including  'duty drawback" and the investment  code. The imr.mediate  result of these exemptions  for our purposes  is
that the share of imports that is dutiable varies greatly  across sectors. Hence the effective  (nominal) tariff is the
product  of the total duty and the share of imports  that is dutiable in each sector. It is this effective  duty which is
the best measure  of the nominal  protection  that the sector is receiving.
These distinctions  become  crucial when one attempts  to implement  a political commitment  to "harmonize
the tariff structure". Turkey initially interpreted  harmonization  to mean that it would levy a zero customn  duty on
imports  from the EC but continue  to levy  certain  of the import  surcharges  on those imports, albeit at A;  reduced  rate.
-24-According  to this interpretation  of harmonization  the customs  dwy on non-EC imports  would  be set equal to the CET
of the EC, and all import surcharges  on non-EC imports  would apply as before.
The net effect of this interpretation,  as far as the EC was concerned,  was that it would face positive  tariffs
on exports to Turkey  when it might  have expected  'harmonization"  to mean that  it would be allowed  to import duty-
free into Turkey.
After negotiation  with the EC, Turkey has considered  revising the harmonization  policy to accord better
with the EC's initial expectations.  According  to this view all surcharges would be incorporated  into the customs
duty, and only this single total tariff would apply to imports. Then the total tariff on EC imports  would be zero,
and would be equal to the CET on non-EC imports.
Assuming the continued use in Turkey of exemptions from import duties,  the effective  (nominal) tariff on
non-EC imports would be lower than the CET which the EC applies on  those imports itself. That is, after
harmonization  Turkey would be applying  lower average tariffs than the EC. One can .'uagine that negotiations  on
this matter are continuing.
Results
Given the political importance  of this trade policy alternative we have considered the effects of each
interpretation.  With either interpretation  of the CET, and VAT as the replacement  tax, the change is welfare from
CET harmonization  is small. With Turkey's interpretation  of the CET, Turkey's welfare  would increase  by 7/1000
of one percent of GDP. With the EC's interpretation  of the CET, Turkey's welfare would be reduced by 24/1000
of one percent of GDP.
What explains  these results?  CET harmnonization  reduces  Turkey's average tariff. For small reductions  in
the tariff, such as implied by the Turkish version of harnonization, there is a slight gain in welfare. As explained
above, further uncoordinated  reductions  in the tariff level from the already low level eventually  result ir. welfare
losses. Thus, although  the difference  is slight, the EC version of harmonization  results in a loss simply  because  the
tariff reduction  is larger.
-25  -On the other hand,  by combining CET harmonization with removal of export subsidies Turkey can expect
to obtain significant welfare gains from  EC tariff harmonization.  This result follows from our analysis of the joint
effects of  removing  tariffs and export subsidies in Figure  2,  along with our  interpretation of  CET  harmonization
as a defacto  across-the-board reduction in tarffs.
Irrespective of the final policy package, our main policy lesson here is that the welfare effects of quibbling
over  the  proper  interpretation  of  CET  harmonization  are  in  the  second-order  of  smalls.  This  conclusion  is
particularly  true in relation to the foregone benefits of more substantial liberalization or uniformity packages.
5.  SENSITIITY  ANALYSIS
How robust are our major policy conclusions to the many assumptions of our numerical model? We answer
this question partially  by considenng  a systematic sensitivity analysis  of the main results with respect  to all of the
elasticities  of the model. 33
Our sensitivity analysis emplovs the procedures developed by Harrison and Vinod [ 1992]. Essentially these
procedures amount to a Monte Carlo simulation exercise in which a wide range of elasticities are independently and
simultaneously perturbed  from their  benchmark  values. These  perturbations  follow prescribed  distributions,  such
as  a t distribution  with a specified  standard deviation  and  degrees of  freedom,  or  a  uniform  distribution  over a
specified  range.34 For  each  Monte  Carlo  run  we  solve  the  counter-factual  policy  with  the  selected  set  of
elasticities.  This process is repeated until we arrive  at the desired  sample size,  in our  case  1000. The results are
then tabulated as a  distribution,  with equal weight  being given  (by construction)  to each  Monte  Carlo  run.  The
upshot is a probability  distribution defined over the endogenous variables  of interest.  In our  case we focus solely
on the welfare impacts of each policy.
33  We appreciate  that there are many  other  assumptions  that remain  fixed as we just vary elasticities,  but regard those  extensions  as
beyond  the scope  of the present  study. For example,  an important question is how our results  might change  as  we examinse  alternative
market  structure  assumptions,  or move from a static framework to a growth setting. We plan to examine  these  extensions  using the SOE
model. but do not  believe that they can be appropnately  treated  briefly enough  to include here.
34  The exact distributional assumptions  used are documented  in Appendix C (available on request).  The MPSS software used  to
implement  the Monte Carlo simulations  as  documented  in Harrison (19901.
- 26 -UT ... set  tariffs equal  to a uniform  value  of 8.  115%  for all sectors.
USX  ... see  expon  subsidies  equal  to a uniformn  value  of 7.399%  for all sectors.
UFD  ... set  all foreign  trade  distortions  (tariffs  & expoll  subsidies)  equal  to their  average  benchmark  values.
U ... set  all domestic  and  foreign  distortioas  equal  to their  average  benchmark  value.
LTAR ... liberalize  tariffs  by setting  them to  zero  across-the-board.
LSX ... liberalize  export  subsidies  by setting  them  to zero  across-the-board.
LSX20  ... liberalize  export  subsidies  by  20%  across-the-board.
LFD ... liberalize  foreign  trade  distortions  by setting  them  to zero  acros-the-board.
LALL  ... liberalize  all distortions  by  setting  them  to zero:  the  'first-best' policy.
ULT ... set  tariffs and  export  subsidies  to their  uniform  values,  and  then  liberalize  tariffs.
ULSX ...  set  tariffs and  export  subsidies  to their  uniformn  values,  and  then  liberalize  expont  subsidies.
LVAT ...  liberalize  the  VAT by setting  it to zero  across-the-board.
Note:  all simulations  use  a lump-sum  replacement  tax.
Figure  5:  Description of the Policy Simulattons Subject to Sensitivity Analysis
The policies that we examine are described in Figure 5, and the results of the sensitivity analysis are
reported in Table 4. In the interests  of reporting  all of the pertinent data in a compact manner,  some of the column
and row headings  are necessarily somewhat  cryptic at first glance. The acronyms  for each simulation  are defined
in Figure 5. The 'Sample Size' column refers to the number of Monte Carlo runs that were actually completed.
In each case we have at least 1000 runs, which should be enough to obtain  a reliable picture of the distribution  of
results.  The 'Point Estimate' column  shows  the welfare  effect  of the policy  when  all elasticities  are set equal  to their
benchmnark,  or point estimate (PE), values. These are the results reported and discussed  earlier. We report the
change in welfare due to the policy  as a percent of GDP, just as before.
The remaining  columns report the results  of the sensitivity  analysis proper. We list the mean, the median,
and the standard deviation, so as to provide  simple indicators  of the location and dispersion of the distribution  of
welfare results. We do not report here the skewness and kurtosis statistics that are necessary to gain a more
complete impression of the distribution. In all cases we find that there is indeed significant skewness in the
distribution,  but insignificant  kurtosis.  The skewness  in these  distributions  manifests  itself  in there being a systematic
difference  between  the mean and median reported. Thus by comparing  these  two statistics  one can see the direction
27 -Table  4: Results of the Sensitivity Analysis
Sanob  PotiS  S.odU  Pnmb.  Prb.  50%  L..  50% Upe  7  Lot  75%  tpe
SMIMti,  Sloet  E.Amut,  M,.  Med  Dovicc  2t 0  a  PE  rBet  Bo  sto
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0  .50  .
LVAT  10O0  4.342  . 4_  00  03  1.X  .017  0.00  .0.21  0.0
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of the skewness  directly. 35
In order to obtain an indication  of the qualitative  policy results we report the 'Prob.  2  oa column,  which
shows  the probability  from the empirical  c'istribution  that  welfare increased  in the counter-factual  policy. This gives
us a measure  of the confidence  that we have the sign right when we look at the Point Estimate  welfare effect or the
Mean or Median. Similarly, we report a column  showing the probability that  a welfare effect greater  than or equal
35  Why  do we  get such significant  skewness  in the distributions?  There  are two general reasons  why this right occur:  induced  skewress
due to our explicit  distributional  assumptions.  and intrinsic  skewness  in the (implicit)  function  linking the set of elasticities  and welfare.
Each can be evaluated.
The explicit  assumptions  made in our sensitivity  analysis  result in a large number of skewed  distributions  for production  activities
that have  benchmnark  Leontief  technologies.  The class of activities  that fall into this category  are those activities  combining  intermnediate
inputs  and value added. In this case we allow perturbations  of 0.5 and 1.0, as well as the benchmark  value of zero. To see if thiS  is the
source  of the skewness  we can just remove  these penurbations  for these activities  and te-run  the sensitivity  analysis  to see if the skewness
disappears.  We have done this for the USX policy simulation  (making  all export subsidies  uniform), and find that it does not account  for the
skewness.
The other possible reason for skewed  results is more subtle than there being skewed  distributional  assumptions,  but could  wen be
more important.  This  has to do with the 'asymmetry' of the implicit  ficwon  that takes a given  set of elasticities  and generates  the welfare
effect. It is perfectly  possible  that equi-sized  penurbations  of a given  elasticity  can have different  absolute  effects  on welfare. For example,
the elasticity  of substitution  between  domestically  produced  and imponed goods in our Armington  aggregate  is set at 2 in the benchmark.
We allow equal increases  and decreases  in this elasticity  in our sensitivity  analysis. However,  it is plausible  that increasing  this elasticity  to
3 from 2 has very little impact  on welfare, whereas  reducing  it from 2 to I has a large impact.  The source  of our priors on this is no more
than visual  and casual inspection  of isoquants  with the relevant  elasticities  of substitution:  once  the elasticity  gets above 2 it stays 'pretty
flat', but dropping it down to I adds 'significant  curvature'. We can evaluate  this source of skewness  with respect to blocks  of elasticities
of the same type by  just sening those  elasticities  equal to their PE value. We do this for the USX  policy simulation,  and with respect to each
elasticity  block. No single block can account  for the skewness.
We conclude  that there is no single block  of elasticities  that is causing this skewness.
- 28  -to the PE welfare effect was obtained. If the PE result is perfectly  representative  of the location  of the distribution
of results we should see this value around one-half; this would be the case if the PE result exactly equalled the
reported Median  result. A value l,wer  (higher) than one-half indicates that the distribution generally lies below
(above) the PE resul,.
Finally, to gain a better sense of the confidence  to be attached  to the PE or Mean result, we report lower
and upper bounds  from 50% and 75% symmetric  confidence  intervals  around the Median  result. These confidence
intervals  simply  show the smallest  and largest values that lie within 50% or 75% of the distribution  centered  on the
Median. Thus a 50% confidence  interval  between 1.1 and 2.3 can be interpreted  as saying that 50% of the Monte
Carlo runs resulted  in welfare results between  these values.
What, then, do we learn from these  sensitivity  analyses  regarding  our policy  conclusions.  Six observations
may be made.
First, the welfare gains from the first-best liberalization  policy (LALL) are robust to uncertainty  over
elasticities. The median and PE estimnates  are each of the same order of magnitude, around 1.39%.
Second. the welfare gains from refonn of export subsidies are not as large as they were with the PE
elasticities.  This applies to the policy  of uniformity  (USX) as well as liberalization  (LSX). In each case the welfare
gains drop to around 0.87% rather than the initial results of 1.0% or so when PE elasticities are used. It is
noteworthy,  however, that  just reducing  export subsidies  by 20% (LSX20)  continues  to generate a relatively  large
fraction  of the welfare gains from the complete  liberalization  of export subsidies.  Given the decline  in welfare gains
due to the USX and LSX policies, this fraction is therefore even larger than before. This confirms the policy
conclusion  as to the importance  of having the highest  export subsidies reduced, at the very least.
Third, there continues to be a welfare loss from unilateral libemlization  of tariffs (LTAR). This loss
increases  from 0.1% of GDP to around 0.2% when we allow for uncertainty  over elasticities.
Fourth, the welfare gains from moving  towards uniformity  of foreign  distortions  (UFD) or all distortions
(U) appear to very robust.
Fifth, the welfare losses obtained when tariffs or export subsidies were liberalized from a benchmark  in
which  all foreign  distortions  were uniform (ULT and ULSX, respectively)  are qualitatively  robust. The welfare loss
- 29 -in the case of tariff liberalization  is somewhat  larger than before, strengthening  our earlier policy conclusion  in this
respect.
Finally, the welfare effects of removing  the VAT with a lump-sum  replacement  (LVAT) are even 'more
neutral" then before. Rather than a welfare loss of 0.342%, we now find a median welfare loss of only  0.09% with
a standard  deviation  of approximately  the same  value. This confirms  the earlier finding that  the existing  VAT serves
well as a practical  alternative to the lump-sum  tax as a distortion-free  replacement  tax.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The first important  policy  conclusion  concerns  the fragility  of the rule-of-thumb  that holds that  small export
subsidies  may be welfare enhancing  as an offset  to existing  import tariffs. We find that this rule-of-thumb  applies
when one assumes  uniform tariffs and export subsidies  across  sectors, but that it is unreliable  as a rule when applied
across-the-board  to sectorally  dispersed  trade  distortions  or for sector-specific  reform. The rule is rehabilitated,  then,
when a country has managed  to reduce the anti-export  bias of the trade regime and has a relatively  uniform set of
trade distortions. This set of circumstances  may characterize an increasing number of countries that have been
following  a path of trade liberalization  in recent decades. In such cases one must be wary about advocating  the
reform of tariffs or export subsidies  alone.
A further important conclusion  from our examnination  is that tariff and export subsidy uniformity  yields
substantial  benefits in welfare terms in Turkey. Although 'Ramsey'  optimal import taxation would call for non-
uniforrn import taxation inversely proportional to the elasticity of import derand  in each sector, the observed
dispersion  of the tariff structure  in Turkey is inconsistent  with optimal  departures from uniform protection. In fact,
in the case of Turkey uniformity  achieves an extremely  high proportion of the benefits  of full trade liberalization.
This result is explained primarily  by the substantial  trade liberalization  Turkey has undertaken  during the decade
of the 1980's. Given its export subsidies  and low level of protection, the trade regime no longer has an anti-export
bias. Rather the principal distortion remnaining  in the trade regime derives from the dispersion of the tariff and
export subsidy structure.
- 30 -Another important policy conclusion that we draw is that the harmonization strategy is significantly inferior
to any of the other strategies.  This result  follows simply  from the fact that harmonization to EC tariffs will require
a  lowering of Turkish  tariffs  from already  low levels,  in the presence  of export subsidies almost as  large as  the
existing average  effective tariff  rate.  Unilateral tariff elimination in the  presence of  export subsidies results  in a
second-best distortion.  The export subsidies become the dominant distortion  in the trade regime,  and the economy
becomes too export oriented.  We argue,  however,  that harmonization  to the EC  tariff structure  can be  a welfare
enhancing policy if accompanied by a policy of removing or reducing export subsidies. The important policy lesson
for Turkey  from this  exercise  is that if it intends to proceed with harmonization  to the CET of the EC then it is
important to accompany that policy with a  reduction in export subsidies.
Summarizing,  the  most important policy conclusion  from  our  analysis concems  the fragility  of first-best
rules-of-thumb as to the welfare benefits of piecemeal trade policy reforms.  In other words,  it is not the case that
any partial movement towards the first-best trade policy for Turkey will result in some fraction of the welfare gains
from that first-best package.  Of course  this is nothing but a restatement  of well-known second-best  results. What
is new,  however, is an attempt to assess the quantitative significance of these effects for a Turkey and we are able
to gain some insights into which  particular distortions  have more or less severe second-best effects.
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- 34 -APPENDIX  A:
ALGEBRAIC  FORMULATION OF  THE  MODEL
The model  is formulated as a system of nonlinear equations corresponding
to the three classes of equilibrium conditions associated with an Arrow-Debreu
general equilibrium: price-coet relations for producers, supply-demand balance
for commodity and factor markets  (including balance of payments),  and income-
expenditure balance for domestic consumers and government.  In SOE these models
are generated using the GAMS programming language and solved using the modified
Newton (SLCP)  algorithm due to  Mathiesen 11985]. In  this framework a central set
of  variables  (prices,  activity  levels  and  income  levels)  characterize  the
economic equilibrium.
The version of the SOE model described here includes allowance  for non-
constant returns to scale and non-competitive pricing. These features are not
used in the present study, but are documented here for completeness.
All important notation is summarized in Figure Al.
Technology,  Preferences  and Market  Clearance  Conditions
Domestic production is  an  aggregate of  domestic and  exported varieties with
a constant elasticity of transformation:
Y=  t 1D,,XI)  =  (aD 0 DoeI)°  +  axX''-l)ieI(e-I)  (1)
This relationship can be interpreted as implying differences in the technical
processes  associated  with  production  for  domestic  and  export  markets.  The
elasticity  of transformation  defined by ei  will  be lower for goods which are
highly differentiated and higher for goods which are relatively homogeneous. The
specification of this elasticity may be influenced by the intended time frame of
the analysis. In the short-run it is more difficult to transform plants between
domestic and export oriented products.
Imports from different trading partners trade off with domestic varieties
in intermediate demand, investment demand and final demand. For simplicity (and
due to limitations of data) we assume that the import composition and import-
A-1Variables
X.  Export of good i.
D,  Domestic sales of good 1.
Ht  Composite ininort  of good i.
mO  Import of good i from region r.
St  Armington aggregate of domestic supply and imports.
C 1 Private consumer demand for good i.
W  Welfare index for the representative domestic consumer.
LI  Labor  inputs  to sector  i.
Kg  Capital inputs to  sector  1.
xIV  Intermediate inputs of good k in sector  i.
f  Variable input of primary k in sector i.
Aj  Fixed input of primary k in sector i.
Y,  Domestic production of good L.
pi  Price of domestic produced good i.
if 1 Price of domestic-import good i composite.
wk  Factor prices k.
TT  Replacement tax multiplier on lump-sum transfers.
-r'  Replacement tax multiplier for factor taxes.
T  Replacement tax multipliers for tariffs.
Export price of good i (exogenous).
Import price of good i from region r(exogenous).
Parameters
GI  Government demand for good i from region.
t,,  Import tariff rate on commodity X  from region r.
sP  Rate of production subsidy for good i.
s4  Export subsidy rate for good i.
JVI  Tax rate on factor inputs to sector i.
T  Lump-sum tax on consumers.
B  Current account balance (net capital inflows).
au  Intermediate input requirements, good i in sector j.
Fk  Primary factor supplies.
Figure Al: Notation
domestic substitution possibilities in investment, intermediate and final  demand
are identical. Under these conditions we can represent inputs as though they were
composed  of  a  single  import-domestic  aggregate  for  each  commodity.  The
aggregation of  domestic and  imported varieties  is characterized  by  a nested
constant-elasticity  function of domestic and imported goods:
S,  Z  4,(D,M,)  =  c(l  D,a  9)1O  +  crg/'  mriy.  (2)
where M,  represents a composite import from two or more regions r:
Ml  a  (E ,  mi r
The market  clearance  condition  for domestic  supply balances  output  from the
Armington aggregation function with intermediate, investment and final demand.
This  condition is:
A-2Si - }  a 1,Y,  + a,  +  I,  + C 1 (3)
in which YJ  is the activity level of sector j, au  is the input requirements of
good i in sector j, and G,,  1,  and C,  are components of final demand associated
with government, investment and final consumption.
Variable  inputs  to  production  include  primary  factors  as  well  as
intermediate inputs of commodities. These are combined in a linearly homogeneous
nested Leontief-CES  form:
x,,  x~  x-,VI (f,)  +  (4)F Y,  =  mir"  a t  t  a4)
where
In this equation x, represents intermediate inputs of good k in sector i, f  is
the variable input of primary fact^r k in sector i, V,()  represents the value-
added  function  for  variable  factors,  f,  represents  primary  factor  inputs to
variable  cost  in  sector i,  and fF represents  the  input of  factor k  to the
formation of fixed costs in sector i.
Domestic welfare is defined by consumption levels of market goods:
w=u  (cl,  ..  *''C  (5
The current account is  balanced at international prices (pf  and PM),  taking
into account exogenous capital flows (B):
L,p,X,  + B  =, p.mi,,  (6)
The  prices  which  appear  in  this  equation  are  exogenous  parameters,  the
international prices of imports and exports. This constraint has an associated
variable which  is the  "real exchange rate'.  The model, however,  contains no
monetary instruments and determines only relative prices.
Factor markets always clear with flexible prices:
,f  - fl'F  =E -Wk  (7)
A-3These only appear for sectors in  which there are increasing returns to scale. The
factor composition of fixed costs is identical to that of variable costs.
Income-Expenditure Balance
Consumer  income  includes primary  factor earnings  plus  foreign  capital
inflows less transfers. Final demand is modelled by budget-constrained  utility
maximization by a representative agent. The budget constraint is written:
,  iTC, =  Lw,E.  +  B - TTT  (8)
In  this equation wk  represents the market price of primary factor  k, B represents
the foreign exchange balance and Tr  T represents the level of 1"-  -sum transfer.
Unlike private households, government demands  are held constant  in all
simulations. The government budget  constraint is accommodated through endogenous
scaling of one of the three government tax instruments so that revenue balances
with expenditure. Government  income consists  of five components:  (i) lumpsum
transfers from households (T), (ii) import  tariffs (ta),  (iii)  value-added taxes
on factor inputs to production (P),  (iv)  less  production subsidies (s,),  (v)  less
export subsidies (sx).  The government budget is:
£,  n  G,  =  r,  T  + T,  M  gt,m,+r  v  if
(9)
-,sip  ( pi  Di  + px  X,  )-  sx  p  Xxi
In  the  government budget equation  parameters which endogenously adjust to  balance
income and expenditure are: rT  for lumpsum transfers,  T,  for tariffs, and r,  for
value-added taxes. In any given equilibrium only one of these parameters departs
from the default value of unity.
Price-Cost Balance in Competitive Harkets
When  technology  exhibits  constant returns  to  scale producers  price  at
marginal  cost. In production the marginal cost of supply for sector i (c,)  is
defined by:
c,  Y, =  r1TJxf,  + (l,r,v,)  Lh  wkfn  (10)
A-4The competitive market structure with constant returns to scale technology and
no barriers  to  entry  drives  excess  profits  to  zero.  Producers  then  equate
marginal cost with market price gross of subsidy, providing the following zero
profit condition:
(l.-sf)  (piDi  + pf  Xi)  4 pfX 1 ss  = clY 1 (11)
In  this  equation  the  first  term  represents  the  value  of  output  gross  of
production  subsidy,  and  the  second  term  captures  the  effect  of  the  export
subsidy.
The import aggregation always equates price with marginal cost. This means
that the value of domestic supply  equals the cost of domestic inputs plus imports
gross of tariffs and rents:
7,  prD  +  ,(l+1r,t, 7) p 1 l mfr  (12)
Monopolistic  Competition
The competitive  equilibrium which  follows from free entry  and constant
returns  to  scale  is  incompatible  with  increasing  returns  technology.  When
production  involves  both  fixed  and  variable  costs  some  alternative  to  the
competitive paradigm must be considered. We consider two market structures, both
of  which  are  consistent  with  IRS:  free-entry  monopolistic  competition,  and
average cost (Ramsey) pricing.
In free  entry monopolistic competition domestic producers set output price
sc  that marginal revenue equals marginal cost, taking into account the effect of
their output on the domestic price level. The number of firms in a given market
is  determined by the break-even condition, so  that in  equilibrium the total value
of markup revenues exactly balances fixed costs of production. As the economic
environment changes, increasing  or decreasing markup revenue, the net (long-run)
impact is  not to change profit but rather to increase or decrease the number of
active firms in the industry. The following features of the model structure are
important determinants of the nature of competition in the domestic market:
domestic and imported varieties are imperfect substitutes;
domestic varieties may be differentiated; and
A-5* demand for the import-domestic aggregate  is price-responsive.
In this section we derive the pricing rules followed by domestic producers in
this environment.
We begin by presuming that demand  for the import-domestic  aggregate  is
represented by the following function:
A(pA)  7  p  (13)
The Armington aggregate is formed through a constant elasticity aggregation of
domestic and imported inputs
A =  ~(a("')  D(I-')/ 1 + aXl/7  M(w/ )  a  '  (D,  M)
in which  D  domestic  aggregate  represents a constant elasticity  aggregate of
varieties from each of N domestic firms
g(q)  (15)
and X  is a similar aggregate of imported goods with price index pu. Let pA and
PD  denote  prices  of the A  and D  aggregates,  and let p,  denote  the  price of
domestic variety i. A is formed through cost minimization:
PA  =  mi  PD(  D)  +p(.)
s.t.  (16)
f (  D,  A) =  1
The price index  of the domestic aggregate, PDT is formed in an analogous fashion,
PD  =  P/ia  I  (q)  =  1). The Armington and domestic cost functions have the
following associated demand functions:  D(P,AA)  =  aD  D&i  A  and  q, pOP)  D  D
I  Demand  for  the  domestic-import  aggregate  arises  from  four  sources:
intermediate inputs,  government, investment  and households.  The resulting demand
function therefore depends on a number of factors including factor prices to the
extent that they affect income.  In  this section we derive pricing rules assuming
a given demand elasticity equal to the benchmark value of p, as though it were
an exogenous parameter.
A-6Both of  these  functions may  be  inverted to  express  price  as  a  function of
quantity.
The domestic producer chooses an output quantity q,  which maximizes profit:
ri(V) -pig,-C (qi  (17)
where  C(Q)  = F  + cq,  is  the cost function representing  both fixed and variable
components. Marginal cost is constant at fixed  factor prices. Due to general
equilibrium effects, however, the cost function will be increasing with output.
The  familiar first-order condition equates  marginal  cost with  marginal
revenue:
,p,  q  =  CP(18)
This can be rewritten to derive an expression for the selling price as a markup
marginal  cost: p,= (1+m)  c,  where the markup  rate m depends on  the perceived
elasticity  of demand.  That  is, ml =  - (1 + es)'  where  e,  =  _ p
api q 1
The  derivation  of  e, depends  on  the  producer's  anticipation  of  other
domestic producers as well as imports. To compute e,  we begin with the inverse
demand function, p,(qj,pDpD),  and apply the chain rule:
aP  a  |iF  =  -1  =  1  pi  +  l  P,aD +  Pi  PD  (19)
E~~~~~1  Ei  i  8g  D 5  . Drq
Under Cournot conjectures the term  - is computed holding q,  fixed for j￿i:
aq,
and  the  term aPD  is  computed  by applying  the  chain  rule a second  time:
8P D  =  8PD  dD  (21)
Combining, we have:
A-7aP,  q,  I qD  J  +  ql[VD,  aPD  (22)
'J-  pg  n  7  D  y  D  q,  J  ;D
Making  the  substitution  we  have:
D  PD
_1  +  1 p 0 D  +  P  D  I  '  (23)
e,  TD j  D  PD5J
We  assume  Cournot  behaviour  by domestic  producers  while  at  the  same  time
assuming  that  producers  regard  imports  as infinitely  elastic  at the world  price
(as consistent  with  our  small  open  economy  assumption).  In this  case:
aD PD = a  + OD  (,j  -O)  (24)
D  D
where 
0 e_  P=DD_pM  is the  domestic  value  share  in the  Armington  aggregate.  As  a
check  notice  that  as  OD  - 1,  - -a  PD _  A,  the  price  elasticity  of demand  for A.
aPD D5
With  symmetric  domestic  firms  - =  1,  so the perceived  elasticity  can be
written  as:2
ef  ;PX  Q  1+UD/  °  7]  (25)
Average  Cost  Pricing  Equilibria
2  If on  the  other  hand  import  quantities  are  fixed,  as might  be  the  case
with  import  quotas,  we apply  an alternative  formulae:
APDD  °  I  °  OD 
and:
I--I-+  OD--
e, 7  [  hl]N  [l  uJ  N
A-8In order to identify the effect of  monopolistic pricing on results we have
formulated an alternative to Cournot pricing and monopolistic competition in IRS
sectors. Our  "contestable markets"  model is formulated  as though  there  is a
single firm in the industry which prices at a markup  on marginal  cost which
exactly  covers  fixed  costs.  Formally,  the  equilibria  which  arise  here  are
equivalent to a regulated monopoly which sets price equal to average cost by
edict.
The structure of technology is identical for the monopolistic competition
and contestable sectors. What is  different is  the determination of the  markup on
marginal cost. Under average cost pricing we have:
m =  F +  c Y  (26)
The fixed cost per firm (F) remains fixed in all simulations while the level of
industry output  (Y) adjusts so that at price equals average cost the level of
supply equals the level of demand.
Pricing  for Export  Marrkets
We presume that exports are priced at marginal cost for each of the non-
competitive pricing rules.
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A-9APPENDIX  B:
THE  TRADE REGIME  IN TURKEY:
A QUANTITATIVE  ASSESSMENT  OF TARIFF,
NONTAtIFF BARRIERS  AND EXPORT  INCENTIVES
In this appendix we provide a quantitative assessment  of the trade regime in Turkey as of early 1990.3
This descriptive  assessment  is used  as  an input into our general  equilibrium  trade policy modelling.  We decompose
the assessment  of the trade regime  into three components:  non-tariff barriers,  tariff barriers  (and their alignment
with the EC)  and  export incentives.  We conclude  that as of early 1990 Turkey  has generally  eliminated  its nontariff
barriers. During  the period of nontariff barrier reduction, Turkey was increasing its tariff barriers. Since 1  988,
however, Turkey has also been reducing  its tariff barriers.
The magnitude  and impact of export incentives  in Turkey  has been  the focus of considerable  interest and
controversy (see Milanovic 119861,  Celasum  and Rodrik  (19881, Rodrik 11988al,  and Arslan and  van Wijnbergen
119901).  Consequently,  an update  on the magnitude  of the export incentive regime is also essential  in evaluating
the overall  trade regime.
We note that  although there were periods during the  1980s when  the official exchange rate was
overvalued,  as  of early 1990 the Turkish  lira was convertible.  This was reflected by the absence  of a black  market
premium, despite  a real appreciation  of the lira between 20 and 25 percent in 1989.
1. Non-Tariff Baiers
During  the decade  of the 1980s, and commencing  in earnest  at the end of 1983, Turkey gradually  and
steadily dismantled its extensive system of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). 4 The last few remaining items that were
subject  to NTBs  in 1989 (the "prior permission" list) were freed in 19905 Turkey does  retain an import certificate
I  We wish to ta  Deborsh  Bata, m Muylou  Uy. Michad  Klein  ad Omar  K"aan  for the povisin  of daa and hclful commeab  on the material  in this
AppadEL
'See BAys=  and  Bltzsr 119881  [19911,  Rodrlk  [1988b]  and  Gmis.  de Melo  nd Um  [19861  for earlier  discussionn  of the  impac of trade  liberalizations  in
Turicy.
'Of  ooune. impo  of such a we  and  nsrcoic  am  restricted.
B-1and permit system; but neither restrains imports." As of early 1990, Turkey is best thought of as a country
without NTBs.
2. Tariff Bartiers
Turkey's tariff regime  is a complicated  system of at least 6 types of duties and surcharges.  Moreover,
there is an extensive system of exemptions from import taxation. Tables 81 and 82 summarize  the exemption
structure by sector, and tariff collection by type of import duty. From table B1 one sees that over 97 percent of
mining imports are exempt from import taxation. From  table 82 one may note that as a result of exemptions total
import taxes were 37.2 percent of the value of dutiable imports in 1988, but only 12.5 percent of the value of
total imports. While NTBs  were being  dismantled  during the 1984-1988 period, tariff collections as a percentage
of dutiable imports steadily rose from 24.8 percent to 37.2 percent, but fell in 1989 to 33.8 percent. In fact,
tariffs were progressively  lowered  through 1989 (see  table  83) and into 1990, so  that they are  lower in early 1990
than the average for 1989.
3. Alignment with the European  Communities
Beginning  in 1973, Turkey  initiated  tariff harmonization  with the European  Communities  (EC).  This  logically
implies moving toward zero tariffs against EC  imports and moving  to the Common External  Tariff (CET)  against
imports from non-EC  countries. 7 Products  were placed  on either a 12 or 22 year list, implying alignment  with the
EC  by either 1985 or 1995. Turkey  began  postponing  its obligations in 1977 and the process  remained  stalled until
1988.
In 1988 Turkey announced  a schedule  of customs  duty alignment  with the EC  through 1993. If continued
at this same  rate, it will bring  about full alignment  by 1995 (see  table B4).8  With respect to the EC, all tariffs will
have  to be reduced,  but some  tariffs against  third country suppliers  may have to be increased.  By and large  CET
harmonization  implies a reduction in the level of nominal tariffs in Turkey.
The principle  problem  for the alignment  process is  that the 'alignment"  just discussed  applies  only to the
lb  cffate.  which  is  ued  by dac  goverment,  need  oaiy be requescd  at the  2 digit level  is grant  outiely  whihin  two  days nd is valid  for oue  year.
The izpoit panil  in gntd  by an audoried bank.
'We dbca  in  a momen  an akefnstive  inattation  of CEI humonization  which  wa adopted  by the  Turkisb  govemment  in emaly  discussionts  of this polky.
'T  policy.  is  hduled  for re_ssment  in 993.
B-2basic customs tariff. There are many import surcharges  that are earmarked  for special funds. 9 Only partial or no
alignment  Is planned for the various  surcharges.  Thus, both  the Support  and Price Stabilization  Fund (SPSFI surcharge and the stamp tax  will be
reduced against the EC from  10 to 6 percent each; as of eerly  1990.  the announced  alignmnont  of these surcharges  has not taken place on schedule.
The Mass Housing Fund (MHF) and the Developmont  and Support  Fund (DSF) levieas  are scheduled to be phased out within  a period of five to  six
years starting In 1993.10
On average the basic custome  duty Is loss than one-third  of the total  import  tax paid. Since Turkey has a longstanding  relatonship  with
the EC In which  It enjoys duty  free status on Its exports  to the EC, the lack of full import  tax  alignment  against  EC Imports  has been a source of
annoyanceto  the EC. Durln  the last year or so, Turkey  has considered  converting  all custome  dutles and surcharges  into  a single Import tax  which
will then be  at at zero on EC Imports and set at the CET on non-EC Imports.  This plan remains controversial  within  Turkey,  with  some govemnment
agencies opposing  It because  of revenue  considerations.  The concem  here is that  Turkey  has so many  exemptions  from  import  taxation  that
Imposing  a single tariff  rate at the CET may significantly  lowar overall  tariff  revenue, as compared to a system In which  all Imports  pay significant
surcharge..  We Illustrate  the differnces  between  these two  versions of  CET harmonization  below  and In the  main text.
4.  Expoft Incentives
Data  on Incentives  to  Turkish exports  between  19885 and 1988  are summarized  In table  85.  We  note  that  export  subsidies  as a
percentageof  total  exports generally  declined significanty,  from  25 percent  of exports  in 1986  to 16 percent In 1988.  Uv 119901 raports  a further
doclirn  in export  subsidies by  2 percent  of the value of  exports  in  1989.11
We decomposa  Incentives  to  exports  Into two  overall  categories:  (II  incentives  granted  through  the  reduction  in  taxes that  would
otherwise  be payable to the  government:  and (2) budgetary  transfers  from the govemnment to the  firm.
Category  11) Includes the following:
(al  waiver  of payments  of eustorn  dudse  (duty  dnwback).  Exporter'  who  hold  encouragemont  cert!ficates  can  Import  duty  free
provided these imports  are less  than 40 to 80  per cent of the value of the exports.  Holder  of these certificates  may  also obtain  foreign
exchange at the official  exchange  rate for their  Import needs. Given the absence of a foreign  exchange  premium above the otRicial rate
In 1990,  the ltter  right  of the export  certificate  has no value".
fbi  reduction  in the amount  of corporate  Incone  tax payable.  Exporters with  more than  9250,000  of Industrial  exports  may reduce
their  taxable  incone  by  18 percent  of their  export  receipts  (as of  eady  19901.  Other  Industries  that  qualify  Include  fresh  truits  and
vegetables,  tourism  revenues and intemationalair  services ("aUy  119901 forturtherdetails).  In 1988  Turkey  introduced  a value added
tax  (VAT).  Any  VAT  paid which  is related  to exports  Is rebated through  the corporato  Income tax  systam.
(c)  waiver  of the payment  of Innirect taxes Irebates).  Commoditias  were classified  Into various  lists which  ostensibly  reflected  their
Indirect  tax  content.  These rebates  were eliminated  after  1988.
CategorY  2 of subsidies to firms Is almost  entirely the SPSF. There is a lit  of  107 commodities  that are eligible  for subaldies under the
SPSF. The govenment  obtains  revenues for this fund  from a combination  of export  taxes on major  agricultural  exports  such as hazelnuts,  raisins
and lamb,  and an Import  surcharge that  was  10 pereent  In 1989  lup from  4 pereant in 1986).  The govemnment plans to reduce  the SPSF import
'See  table  B2 for their  quantitative  imt
Reductim of the MHP an  DSF rdidies  commenced  ahed  of schedule  in mid-1989.
lhe  calcuation for 1989  excludes  the cumoa duty exmptow.  so it  s not stricty comprable.
In  naddition.  holden  of expo  encouagemeat  cerficates may  obtain  expoft cadit at below  mte*a rte  of int  See Anla  aS  van Wrnbergen [(1990.
B-3surcharge  by half a percentage  point per six monthe  until it reaches  6 percent  In 19913
For  the 1980-1984 peioid, Milanovic  (19861  found  great disparitieo  In  the export Incentives  depending  on the sector; for example  the
metal products,  electrical  machinery  and non-ferrous  metals  Industries  received  extremely high aubsidles  194,  62 and 49 percent  reopectively).
The system  In 1990 Is primarily  dependent  on tax Incentives  ovailabla  to any firm l86 percent  of the Incentives  to exports In 1988 were through
category  1  tax Incentives)  which should  reduce  the dispersion  in the export subsides.  The  export subsidy  rates  employed  in the study are  discuesed
In the next section.
. Final  Estnmstes  Used  In the Model
There  ae  many  detailed  aspects  of the trade regime  In  Turkey  which it Is not possible  to capture  without considerable  reconstructlon
of existing data and/or extensions  to the SOE  framework. A good example  is the way In which tax Incentives are used to Implement  export
subsidies.  To the extent that theas  Incontives  have already  been Included  In the Input-Output  table, we would have to reconstruct  the affected
transactions.  Rebates  on VAT are  one such  Incentive,  and appear  impliclty as  differences  in the VAT rates  we observe  In  the 1985 10  table.  Even
If we could determine  the sectoral values  of these  Incentives,  we would need  to make  the VAT policy instrument  in our model  a function of the
export subsidy  policy Instrument. At present  they are each specified  exogenously  as data.
Naether  of these  data  or modelling  extensions  are  infeasible.  However,  we have been  obliged  to trade-off simplicity  of formulatlon  with
.reality'  In such instances,  given the limited resources  at our disposal.
Table  86 lists the final estimates  for each  of the policy  Instruments  that are  used In  our model. We appreciate  that there may be some
biases  In  some  of these  numbers.  and  would encourage  any reader  with 'better  numbers' to please  share  them with usl For  the present,  we simply
point out several key features of these  estimates In relation to the previous  discussion.
Firt,  the VAT rates that we use show a great deal of variation across  sector.  One reason  for auch variation, of course, are the
exemptions  from the VATdue to the export subsidy  schemejust  mentioned.  Another  reason  is that the stattutory  VAT rates  are  not indeed  uniform.
However,  one further reason  for the disparity  we observe  is that our rates  are  derived  from observed  collections data  in 1985. The VAT  had barely
been  Introduced  In Turkey  In 1  985, and  it Is known that there were a  great many  administrative  problems  with collection procedures.  We propose
replacing  these 1985 imputed  rates with more recent data if we can obtain  the latter.
Second,  the export subsidy  rates  seem  to be a bit 'low'.  Their weighted  average,  using 1985 exports as  weights, is just over  7%. The
averages  we found from the data reported  In  Table 5 are  much higher  than this, specifically 19.4% and 14.8% In 1985 and 1988, respectively.
One reason  for the discrepancy  Is  that our data do not reflect the tax incentives,  which accounted  for 94.3% and 86% of all export Incentives
In 1985 and 1988. These  appear  elsewhere  in our  data, as  discussed  above.  Hence  one might argue  that we should  scale  up the export subsidy
data we do have to reflect the greater Impact of export subsidies.
On  the other hand If the data  that we do have  only reflects  budget-related  subsidies  (using  the terminology  of table 851  then  our  average
'Statemof  Dr. rigrei, UndetcretayofSPO. Ad Hoc  CommitteMeeidng.  Brumeb.  Dec.  20  ad  21. 1988.  IEerc reunconfirmedrepol dthtaTurkey
mmd. to contue  wih tb  progressive  lowering  of the SPSFipot  chae 4  it rach4  percaiL Panerducon.howevere  w  behind chedul 
of early  1990.
B4level  of subsidy  I  too high, and should be scaled  down to  ,und  I or 2%. Faced  wlth these  altematives,  we elected  to maintain the valuee  we
have since  there l  a plausible  case for scaling  them up or d.wn.
Third, the tariff rates  eem at face  vakue  to be much more dispered than might be expected from our eadler discuesion  of the
Importance  of uniform  import  urcharges.  The explanation  for ths appearnce Is  that Turkey  does have considerable  dispersion  in It's customs
duty and In the proportion  of Imports In each sector that Is exempt ftm  any import taxation.
Table 67 decomposse  each of these  components  of the final tarff  rate. The second  column  shows the percentage  of Imports  of this
sectorthatwas dutiable  li.e., non-exempt).  The  third column  shows  the statutoryoustoms  duty. The  next four columns  report  the values  of various
Import surcharges. Total Duty  Is then defined as the sum of each of these surcharges  and the customs duty. The  Effective Duty  Is then
computed  as the product of the total duty and the share  of the sectores  Imports  that are dutiable. it  is this last column which we use as  our
estimate  of the benchmark  tariff In our model.
An Important  operational  Implicton  of table 87 Is that one should  be careful to understand  that calling  for a 'unifomT taiff'  In our
settn  requires  not only that the customs duty be made  uniform  but that the share  of Imports  that h  dutiable also  be made  uniform. The latter
undoubtedly  Invoves a much more significant  change In current practice.
Table  86 lists our estimates  of the various interpretatons of the policy  of harmonization  to the CET  of the EC. The second  column
repeats  the benchmark  tariffs just discussed.  The  third column  lists the nominal  CET  for 1986 reported  In Cowley and Davenport  (I 988; tables
B6 & 871.
The two rival Interpretations  of hamonization are called  CETI and CET2. CETi assumes  that Imports from the EC receive a zero
custome  duty and that certain surchargea  are reduced  on them as  discussed  efler,  the tariff rates shown as  CETI  -EC  are  the result. Taritfs on
Rest  of World IROW)  Imports  under  CETI are computed  by Just  replacin  the customs  duty of table 87 with the CET;  the tariff rates shown as
CETI  -ROW  then result.  Finally,  the CET2  Interpretation  in that the effective duty on EC  Imports  I  set  to zero  but that the effective duty on ROW
imports Is set equal  to the CET.1
4
Table  88 demonstrates  thatthere I a very significant  difference  In  the  nominal  tariff regime  In Turkey  depending  on  which Interpretation
of CET harmonization  is adopted.
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B-5TABLE 8I:  Tltan  Analysi  of 103  IMnpost.  and  Import Exnmptions
Vakuee In Mllon  US$)
IOTaL  VAM.  mW  Visa"ri  TO UMB  OUNCOMI.Woom  mm  UKWIWO'
Xft  96  40  Tqt  Von  ot~~~~t_  V  To  Ms  US=
The Whole Economy  14,339.7  100.0%  4,470.8  31.2%  0.668.8  88.8%  7,347.0  74%
- Exo. Cjds  Petrleum  11,906.4  83.0%  4,447.6  37.4%  7,457.8  62.6%  4,969.1  68%
Agricultu  464.8  3.2%  178.9  38,7%  278.0  81.3%  44.6  16%
Mining  2,697.0  18.1%  73.8  2.8%  2,623.1  97.2%  2,476.8  98%
Manufacturng  11.287.9  78.7%  4,221.1  37.4%  7,066.8  62.6%  4,826.7  68%
'  A otLMfQ
Consuner  loods  (MFG)  1,613.3  . 13.4%  602.3  43.8%  860.9  56.2%  682.2  68%
Intartned Goods IMFG)  6,760.8  51.0%  2.176.4  37.8%  3,684.4  62.2%  1,713.8  48%
Captal  Goods IMFOI  4.013.8  36.8%  1,382.4  34.4%  2,631.4  66.6%  2,629.7  96%
2-01glt ISIC Sectors
31 Food.Boveragee,Tobaoco  693.6  5.3%  253.7  42.7%  339.9  57.3%  16%
32 Textiles & Leattr  328.8  2.9%  144.4  43.9%  1S4.2  56.1%  79%
33 Wood,  Coit,  & Product.  36.6  0.3%  16.1  46.3%  19.5  54.7%  100%
34 Paper & Punting  290.9  2.6%  77.4  26.6%  213.6  73.4%  38%
36 Chemicals. Petr. Coal  3,166.8  28.1%  1,422.0  44.9%  1,744.8  55.1%  62%
36 NonnetaUlIc Mnbals  192.6  1.7%  98.0  60.9%  94.5  49.1%  33%
37 Basic Metal Industlea  11,885.6  16.7%  497.1  26.4%  1,388.6  73.6%  34%
38 Metal Prods, Machinery  4,762.4  42.1%  1,682.7  36.4%  3,069.7  64.6%  95%
39 Other  Manulotuwrft  41.9  0.4%  29.7  70.9%  12.2  29.1%  78%
3-Dlgit ISIC Sectors
311 Food Manudacturn  404.6  3.8%  65.8  16.2%  339.0  83.8%  16%
313 Bevetages  19.3  0.2%  18.8  97.1%  0.6  2.9%  66%
314 Tobacco  169.7  1.6%  169.3  99.8%  0.4  0.2%  100%
321 Textiles  271.9  2.4%  131.6  48.4%  140.4  61.6%  100%
322 WearInf  Apparel  2.1  0.0%  1.8  64.0%  0.3  16.0%  100%
323 Leather Products  61.1  0.6%  7.7  16.1%  43.4  84.9%  9%
324 Foot Wear  3.6  0.0%  3.4  96.0%  0.1  4.0%  100%
331 Wood,  Cork, & Products  26.6  0.2%  14.9  66.1%  11.7  43.9%  100%
332 WoodenFum&F  trs  9.0  0.1%  1.2  13.2%  7.8  66.8%  100%
341 Paper Products  269.0  2.4%  71.8  28.06%  197.4  73.4%  33%
342 Printing & Pubflshlng  21.8  0.2%  6.8  28.7%  16.0  73.3%  100%
351 Industal  Chemics  2.129.4  18.9%  937.8  44.0%  1,191.7  66.0%  68%
362 Other Chemical Prods  500.6  4.4%  277.1  65.4%  223.5  44.6%  93%
353 Petruleun  RefinerIs  181.8  1.4%  119.1  73.6%  42.7  20.4%  67%
364 Petroleum & Coal Prods  278.4  2.6%  26.7  9.6%  261.7  90.4%  6%
365 Rubber PRoducu  64.8  0.6%  44.4  68.6%  20.4  31.4%  98%
356 Pbtsa  Product  Neov  31.9  0.3%  16.9  53.1%  16.0  46.9%  100%
361 Ceramic Product  13.4  0.1%  0.6  49.6%  0.8  60.6%  100%
362 Glases  & Gles  Producto  29.3  0.3%  19.9  68.I1  9.3  31.9%  100%
369 Other  Nonnmt Min Prods  149.8  1.3%  71.4  47.7%  78.4  52.3%  20%
371  Iron & Steel 8-Mst  t,  1,487.7  13.2%  378.1  25.4%  1,109.6  74.6%  33%
372 Nonferrous  8Met  Ind  398.0  3.6%  119.0  29.9%  279.0  70.1%  36%
381 Metal  Products Nec  387.3  3.4%  111.4  28.8%  275.9  71.2%  100%
382 Noneectric  MahInry  2.293.6  20.3%  768.8  33.4%  1,627.0  66.6%  96%
383 Ebetrical  Machinery  1,124.6  10.0%  388.1  34.3%  738.5  65.7%  96%
384 Transport Equipment  676.5  6.0%  282.4  38.8*  414.1  61.2%  98%
386 Scientifi  EquIpment  270.4  2.4%  166.2  67.8%  114.2  42.2%  67%
390  Other Manufacturng  41.9  0.4%  29.7  70.9%  12.2  29.1%  78%
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q tTABLE  92: Sumov  ary of Imports and Import Taxes:  1904-1988
(Values  in billion Turkish  Ura)
1984  1985  198  1987  1988  1989 (Prelim.)
GDPATCURRENTFACTORCOSTS  17,349.1  25,526.1  35,627.8  52,928.6  91,38572  151,823.8
CIF  TOTAL IMPORT  VALUE  3,924.7  5,879.8  7,433.4  12,539.4  20,312.0  33,000
% Imports subject to duties  29.8%  35.8%  38.9%  34.2%  31.1%  30.0%
IMPORTS  SUBJECT  TO DUTIES  1,169.5  2,105.0  2,742.9  4,288.5  6,317.0  9,400
REVENUE  COLLECTIONS
TAXES
Gross  Customs  Duties (1)  187.1  228.1  345.8  505.7  704.6  727.7
Stamp Duty  18.1  74.2  135.2  300.0  507.1  968.8
Wharf Duty  41.4  62.1  60.6  92.1  129.1  252.4
TOTAL TAXES  226.6  362.4  541.4  897.8  1340.8  1948.9
LEVIES
SPSF  Import Surcharge  29.1  76.6  113.0  203.3  565.3  793.2
MHF/DSF  Import Levies  33.9  79.2  174.8  291.0  446.4  607.3
Duties  to Invest/FX  Revenue  Fund  2.1  8.2  53.4  88.4  185.6  0.5
TOTAL LEVIES  65.1  164.0  341.2  582.7  1197.3  1401.0
TOTAL IMPORT  TAX REVENUES  291.7  526.4  882.6  1480.5  2538.1  3346.4
Import Revenues/GDP  1.7%  2.1%  2.5%  2.8%  2.8%  2.2%
REVENUES  AS % OF  TOTAL IMPORTS  TAXES
Gross  Customs Duties  (1)  4.3%  3.8%  4.6%  4.0%  3.5%  2.2%
Sta.m,p  Duty  0.5%  1.3%  1.8%  2.4%  2.5%  2.9%
Wharf Duty  1.1%  1.1%  0.8%  0.7%  0.6%  0.8%
TOTAL  TAXES  5.8%  6.2%  7.3%  7.2%  6.6%  5.9%
LEVIES
SPSF  Import Surchargeq  0.7%  1.3%  1.5%  1.6%  2.8%  2.4%
MHF/DSF  Import Levies  0.9%  1.3%  2.4%  2.3%  2.2%  1.8%
Duties  to Invest/FX Revenue  Fund  0.1%  0.1%  0.7%  0.7%  0.9%
TOTAL LEVIES  1.7%  2.8%  4.6%  4.6%  5.9%  4.2%
TOTAL IMPORT  TAX REVENUES  7.4%  9.0%  11.9%  11.8%  12.5%  10.1%
REVENUES  AS % OF  IMPORTS  PAYING  DUTIES  TAXES
Gross Customs  Duties (1)  14.3%  10.7%  12.6%  11.8%  11.2%  7.3%
Starrp Duty  1.5%  3.5%  4.9%  7.0%  8.0%  9.8%
Wharf Duty  3.5%  3.0%  2.2%  2.1%  2.0%  2.5%
TOTAL TAXES  19.4%  17.2%  19.7%  20.9%  21.2%  19.7%
LEVIES
SPSF  Import Surcharge  2.5%  3.6%  4.1%  4.7%  8.9%  8.0%
MHF/DSF  Import Levies  2.9%  3.8%  6.4%  6.8%  7.1%  6.1%
Duties  to Invest/FX Revenue  Fund  (2)  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.
TOTAL LEVIES  5.4%  7.4%  10.5%  11.5%  16.0%  14.2%
TOTAL IMPORT  TAX REVENUES  24.8%  24.6%  30.2%  32.5%  37.2%  33.8%
Note:  (1) Includes revenues  collected  from municipality  tax.
(2) N.A. since imports paying this levy are not included  as imports subject to duties.
B-7TABU 8l
Evnb  cr Tw*Mk  ktna¶ Tact.:  IOf  Muvaw  3, SI
AVERAGE  TARtFFS  AVERAGE  TARIFF  CHANGES
1988.  Jan 89-  MaV  89-  Aug 89-  1988.
1989  1 89  5/89  8/89  11189  Jan88  Mav 89  Aug 89  Nov 89  Nov 89
TheWholeEconomv  23.9  25.4  22.5  17.7  10.9  8%  *12%  *21%  -38%  -64%
- Agriculture  18.1  16.9  13.4  13.1  10.9  -7%  -21%  *2%  *17%  *40%
Mining  17.4  14.1  14.1  13.0  6.7  *19%  0%  -8%  *48%  -81%
Menufecturin  24.6  26.2  23.3  19.0  11.0  7%  *11%  *23%  -39%  *65%
Consumn Goocl IMFGi  34.6  35.3  30.8  21.4  17.4  2%  -13%  -31%  *19%  *50%
Intwrned  Goode  IMFGI  18.8  17.2  10.1  13.4  5.7  4%  -8%  *17%  *67%  -85%
Capital  Goods  IMFG)  29.8  28.3  24.4  21.7  10.1  -6%  -14%  -11%  *63%  .88%
31 Food,8everagee,Tobacoo  29.1  31.7  23.9  22.9  20.2  9%  -25%  *4%  *12%  *31%
32 Textiles & Leather  33.6  34.9  32.8  15.4  13.8  4%  -4%  -53%  *10%  -59%
33 Wood, Cork. & Product.  29.1  32.8  31.1  23.4  10.8  13%  *6%  *25%  -54%  .63%
34Paeper&Printing  15.5  18.7  18.3  17.3  4.5  21%  *2%  *5%  .74%  -71%
35 Chericeai, Petr,  Coal  15.5  15.5  14.8  13.7  4.8  0%  -5%  *7%  -06%  *69%
36 Nonmetallic  Minerals  33.1  33.8  28.2  23.0  16.3  2%  -17%  -18%  *29%  -51%
37 Basic  Metd Industries  I3.2  11.5  11.5  10.8  4.8  -13%  0%  .8%  .56%  -64%
38 Metal Prods.  Machiney  31.0  29.3  25.5  22.0  11.5  -5%  -13%  *14%  *48%  .83%
39OtherManufacturing  33.8  35.8  28.3  28.0  18.0  8%  -21%  *1%  -43%  *53%
311 Food  Manufacturing  28.7  31.3  23.1  22.2  19.4  9%  -2e%  *4%  -13%  -32%
Beverages  37.1  39.6  37.4  37.0  36.0  7%  68%  .1%  *3%  *3%
314 Tobacco  26.0  25.0  25.0  25.0  25.0  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%
321 Textiles  33.1  34.2  32.6  11.8  11.5  3%  -5%  -84%  -3%  -65%
322 Wearing  Appwarl  41.4  40.8  39.4  26.9  24.4  *2%  -3%  *34%  -6%  -41%
323 Leather  Products  18.2  28.9  28.9  28.8  15.4  59%  0%  -1%  -48%  -t15%
324Foot Wear  31.7  37.8  20.0  20.0  15.0  19%  *47%  0%  -25%  -53%
331 Wood, Cork. & Products  26.3  30.2  30.2  23.7  9.5  15%  0%  -22%  .60%  -64%
332 Wooden  Fum & Fixtr  50.0  48.3  36.8  21.7  18.3  -3%  *24%  -41%  -18%  -83%
341 Paper  Products  15.4  18.7  18.6  17.3  3.3  21%  -1%  *7%  *81%  -79%
342 Printing  & Publishing  16.0  18.7  17.3  17.4  8.3  17%  -7%  1%  -52%  *48%
351 Industria Chemicas  12.3  12.4  12.4  11.4  2.0  1t9  0%  -8%  -82%  -84%
352 Other  Chemical  Prods  22.9  18.1  17.7  15.7  7.9  -21%  -2%  -11%  -50%  -68%
353 Petroleum  Refenes  15.1  13.9  13.9  13.9  9.6  *8%  0%  0%  -32%  -37%
354 Petroleum  & Coal  Prods  10.9  16.9  18.9  1e.9  e.5  55%  0%  0%  -62%  -40%
355 Rubber  Products  38.0  33.9  33.9  32.5  13.0  .8%  0%  *4%  -60%  -64%
368 Plastic  Product Nec  40.0  21.8  16.7  15.3  11.2  *46%  *28%  -3%  -27%  -72%
381 Cerarric  Product.  35.7  37.2  33.4  23.6  18.0  4%  -10%  -29%  -32%  -55%
362 Gles  & Glaes  Producet  36.0  37.0  29.2  22.3  18.8  4%  -22%  -24%  -25%  -53%
389 Other Nonmet  Min Prods  30.1  28.9  25.9  23.6  16.0  -4%  *10%  *9%  -32%  *47%
371 Iron & Steel  B-Met Ind  11.9  10.5  10.5  10.4  2.7  -12%  0%  -1%  -74%  -78%
372Nonfarrous8.MetInd  14.3  13.5  13.4  11.8  8.6  *6%  -1%  -12%  -28%  .40%
381 Mel  Products  Nec  39.3  35.8  31.8  28.2  16.4  -9%  -11%  -18%  -37%  -58%
382 Nonelectric  Machinery  32.2  31.7  25.8  23.9  12.1  -2%  -19%  *7%  -49%  -62%
383 Electrical  MachinerV  26.5  23.6  21.9  19.4  9.2  .11%  -7%  -11%  *53%  -85%
384 Transport  Equipment  31.4  32.8  30.5  25.3  15.1  4%  -7%  -17%  -40%  -52%
Scientific  Equipment  23.2  20.9  18.2  13.0  4.5  -10%  *13%  -29%  -65%  -80%
OtherManufacturing  33.8  35.8  28.3  29.0  16.0  6%  .21%  -1%  -43%  -53%
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l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ TABLE  B4
TURKEY  - ANNOUNCED  TARIFF  REDUCTIONS
(a) Schedule  towards zero tariff rates with EEC  Countries
12-Year List Reductions  22-Year List Reductions
Year  Annual  Total  Annual  Total
1989  10%  40%  10%  30%
1990  10%  60%  10%  40%
1991  10%  60%  10%  50%
1992  10%  70%  10%  60%
1993*  10%  80%  10%  70%
1994vv  10%  90%  10%  80%
1995e  10%  100%  10%  100%
(b) Schedule  towards harmonization  with the  CET
12-Year List Adjustments  22-Year  List Adjustments
Year  Annual  Total  Annual  Total
1989  20%  20%  20%  20%
1990  0%  20%  0%  20%
1991  20%  40%  0%  20%
1992  0%  40%  20%  40%
1993*  40%  80%  0%  40%
1994*  0%  80%  40%  80%
1995  20%  100%  20%  100%
*  The schedules  for 1993-1995 have not been  announced.  These estimate are good guesses  based on discussions
with SPO.
B-9TAg  8a
198  1988  1987  1g98
Totd  Expot  (gm000  7,959,100  7,456.800  10,190,100  11,602.071
Tain  Ir.(vee:
Rdoat  (VAT)  (TL mmd  287.378  281,801  437,207  e74,s02
(8Oo00  554,420  420,e77  510,947  476,391
(35.9)  (22.41  (21.6)  (27.8)
Coporat  Tex ROt)on  M  1mm)  76,600  129,700  357,800  677,859
NM0001  147,778  193,756  418,147  478,549
(9.6)  (10.3)  (17.7)  27.7)
Cunom  Outv Exmmph  (n  mm)  391,818  693,50e  1,001,193  748,747
($80)  755,909  1,030,104  1.170,050  528,593
(48.9)  (55.1)  (49.6)  (30.6)
Totld Tax Rdatd  (tO0)  1,458,108  l,tff,537  2,099,150  1.493,533
(94.3)  487.7)  (98.9)  (98.0)
Bug2t  Rdaed  &,bsdi:
SPSF  (TTL  mnwl  0  8,102  145,500  330.347
(9000  0  12,103  170,040  233.215
(0.8)  (7.2)  (13.5)
RUSP  (TI mnel
(s000
Totd Subsk1u  from EB.  (9000)  87,838  230.522  261.453  241,366
(5.7)  (12.31  (11.1)  (14.0)
Tot)  leoe  (NM)000)  1,545,946  1.8S1,059  2.360.eo3  1,724,899
(100)  (100)  (100)  (100)
ft-rftedExp-  19.4  25.2  23.2  14.8
Exdeu  ReA  (Tu9US)  518.3  868.4  855.7  1416.5
Flg  hi pwaud  we  . hI  tod  hoentivet.
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Final Eetimates of Policy Instrunmnts
(exprossed  In percentages)
1985  1989  Export  Production
ID  Sector  Tariffs  Tariffo  Subsidles  VAT  Subsidles
AGR  Agriculture  4.1  8.0  0.9  4.2
AIR  Air Transport  2.3
ALC  Alcoholic Beverages  22.0  72.3  8.2  4.7
ANI  Animal Husbandry  15.0  e.0  0.9
APP  Wearing Apparel  8.3  22.8  13.5  12.8
BLD  Building Construction  16.5
CEM  Cement  3.9  2.6  18.0  7.5
CHM  Other Chemical Products  19.8  15.7  15.7  11.4  2.4
COL  Coal Mining  0.7  0.7  7.8  3.4
COM  Communication  2.5  8.3  2.8  2.0
CON  Other Construction  4.5
ELE  Electricity  3.6  2.0
ELM  Electrical Machinery  35.3  11.0  29.7  9.4
FAB  Fabricated Metal Products  48.4  10.0  69.7  12.8
FIN  Financial lnstitutions  & Insurance  9.7
FIS  Fisheries  23.5  34.9  0.3
FOR  Forestry  20.5  3.9  1.1
FRT  Fertilizers  1.3  2.5  15.7  2.5  0.9
GAS  Gas Manufacture & Waterworks  3.4
GLS  GIbss & Glass  products  03.0  31.8  16.9  5.2
IRN  Iron & Steel  16.3  4.6  21.4  20.1
LND  Other Land Transport  3.6  0.8
MAC  Machinery except Electrical  20.2  10.5  9.6  6.0  0.8
MEA  Meat Processing  13.7  4.2  8.2  1.8
OFP  Manufacture of Other Food Products  38.7  30.1  8.2  15.0
OMP  Other Non-metallic Mineral Production  27.1  32.5  9.5
OWN  Ownership of Dwellings  2.0
PPS  Personal  & Professional Services  0.6  18.9
PUB  Public Services
REF  Petroleum Refineries  150.7  18.2  15.7
RES  Restaurants & Hotels  9.2
RUB  Rubber Products  49.8  25.3  20.0  7.7
SUG  Sugar  16.9  32.3  8.2  8.4  9.0
TEX  Textiles  26.2  19.4  13.5  14.1
TOB  Tobacco  52.1  67.3  2.4
TRD  Wholesale & Retail Trade  10.5
VEG  Vegetable & Animal Oils & Fats  2.9  3.9  8.2  12.1  0.8
VEH  Lend Transport Vehies  & Equipment  24.6  20.1  15.1  25.8
WAT  Water Transport  2.3  2.8
WOO  Wood & Cork Products  23.0  13.7  1.6  13.e
B-ilTABLE  87
C4,W"wW  of VA E¶wt.8  T.W  IW.  0. T."4
Pw"  CwtoJ  To8M  EWGC
ODob  0  S  r  v  E  sFm  a  W  *.  MHF09  F  o  v  0t
AOM  22.  2.5  Io0  10.0  4.0  0.3  34.8  7.8
AOR  17.8  1 2  100  10.0  4.0  8.3  33.5  8.0
ALC  100.0  40.0  100  10.0  4.0  8.  72.3  72.3
AM  17.8  1.2  10.0  10.0  4.0  8.3  33.5  4.0
APP  722  17.3  10.0  10.0  4.0  83  40.0  38.8
8EV  70e  30.4  10.0  10.0  4.0  8.3  42.7  48.3
CEM  6.1  0.1  10.0  ¶0.0  4.0  8.3  32.4  2.8
cm  49.2  0.8  ¶0.0  10.0  4.0  8.3  332  10.4
co.  0.0  10.0  i0.0  4.0  8.3  32.3  1.8
CRU  0.8  10.0  10.0  4.0  8.3  32.3  0.2
D8O  e2  0.9  0.0  10.0  4.0  8.3  33.2  2.7
ELM  31.8  2.4  10.0  10.0  4.0  8.3  34.7  11.0
FA8  27.5  4.1  *0.0  *o.0  4.0  8.3  3e.4  0o.0
FIB  82.5  10.0  1o0  10.0  4.0  8.3  42.3  34.0
FOO  63.8  8.0  10.0  10.0  4.0  8.3  0.3  21.8
FOR  12.0  0.4  *o0o  10.0  4.0  83  32.7  3.9
FRN  27.3  0.4  ¶0.0  10.0  4.0  0.3  37.7  10.3
FRT  7.7  0.4  ¶.O0  ¶0.0  4.0  8.3  32.7  2.5
FRU  90.7  18.7  a0o  ¶0.0  4.0  8.3  49.0  47.3
FtOR  .4  0.7  *0.0  10.0  4.0  8.3  33.0  2.1
GM  342  0.7  *0.0  10.0  4.0  83  33.0  ¶1.3
088  74.2  10.5  10.0  10.0  4.0  8.3  42.0  31.8
0RN  7.4  0.1  *o0  10.0  4.0  8.3  32.4  2.4
fN  13.3  0.1  10.0  ¶0.0  4.0  8.3  32.4  4.3
IRD  17.5  oo  *0.0  *0.0  4.0  8.3  32.4  5.7
MAC  27.  2.5  10.0  10.0  4.0  83  34.8  9.8
UEA  12.8  0.2  10.0  10.0  4.0  8.3  32.5  4.2
NWm  184  0.8  10.0  ¶0.0  4.0  8.3  32.9  e.0
NFO  7.8  0.1  10.0  10.0  4.0  8.3  32.4  2.8
NMM  ¶0.5  0.2  ¶0.0  ¶0.0  4.0  8.3  32.5  5.4
OFP  08.7  ¶0.3  10.0  ¶0.0  4.0  8.3  42.0  29.3
0O1  51.8  3.e  10.0  ¶0.0  4.0  8.  35.  1¶8.6
OMP  75.7  8.5  10.0  0.0  4.0  8.2  40.8  32.5
OTE  7.1  0.1  ¶o0  ¶0.0  4.0  8.3  32.4  2.3
PAP  38.8  0.8  10.0  10.0  4.0  0.3  332  12.8
PET  27.  1.5  ¶o.0  10.0  4.0  8.3  33.8  92
PLO  07.0  7.2  o0  10.0  4.0  8.  3S.0  22.8
Po  342  4.3  ¶00o  ¶0.0  4.0  8.3  38.8  12.8
REF  49.0  0.3  10.0  *0.0  4.0  83  32.8  102
FM  12.1  1.7  ¶eo  ¶0.0  4.0  8.  34.0  4.1
RUS  04.5  7.0  10*0  10.0  4.0  8.3  39.3  25.3
SHP  7.3  1.2  ¶0.0  ¶0.0  4.0  8.3  33.6  2.4
8w  64.8  4.7  ¶0o0  10.0  4.0  8.3  37.0  24.0
sUe  100.0  1OO  ¶0.0  4.0  8.3  32.3  32.3
TEX  51.7  5.4  ¶0.0  ¶0.0  4 0  8.3  37.7  19.5
TOO  ¶00.0  25.0  10.0  o0.0  4.0  e.3  57.3  57.3
VEO  6.8  0.1  ¶0.0  ¶0.0  4.0  83  32.4  1.8
VEN  80.4  9.8  ¶0.0  ¶0.0  4.0  8.3  42.1  28.8
WoO  04.8  3.8  *0.0  ¶0.0  4.0  8.3  35.0  ¶0.8
B-12TABLE  BS
Effective Tarff  Under  Alternative CET  Hanmonization  Policies
Benchmark  CET  CETI-EC  CET1-ROW  CET2-ROW
AGIV  7.8  5.0  5.4  8.3  1.1
AGR  6.0  4.3  5.7
ALC  72.3  15.0  24.3  47.3  15.0
ANI  6.0  4.3  5.7
APP  35.8  12.5  17.5  32.3  9.0
BEV  49.3  10.0  19.1  33.2  7.9
CEM  2.6  2.0  2.6
CHM  16.4  6.5  12.0  19.1  3.2
COL  1.6  1.2  1.6
CRU  0.3  0.2  0.3
DRG  2.7  6.5  2.0  3.2  0.5
ELM  11.0  5.5  7.7  12.0  1.7
FAB  10.0  5.6  6.7  10.4  1.5
FIS  34.9  20.0  26.6
FOO  21.6  10.0  13.0  22.6  5.3
FOR  3.9  2.9  3.9
FRN  10.3  4.8  6.6  10.1  1.3
FRT  2.5  1.9  2.5
FRU  47.4  7.0  23.5  38.0  6.8
FUR  2.1  7.5  1.8  2.5  0.5
GIN  11.3  10.0  8.3  14.5  3.4
GLS  31.8  4.0  18.0  26.9  3.0
GRN  2.4  1.8  2.4
IRN  4.3  3.0  3.2  4.7  0.4
IRO  5.7  3.0  4.3  6.2  0.5
MAC  9.6  5.0  6.7  10.3  1.4
MEA  4.2  20.0  3.1  6.7  2.6
NFM  6.1  3.0  4.5  6.5  0.6
NFO  2.6  3.0  1.9  2.8  0.2
NMM  5.4  5.0  4.0  6.2  0.8
OFP  29.3  16.5  16.7  33.5  11.3
OMI  18.6  5.3  12.6  19.5  2.8
OMP  32.5  19.4  25.7
OTE  2.3  6.5  1.7  2.8  0.5
PAP  12.9  5.5  9.4  14.7  2.1
PET  9.2  6.6  8.8
PLS  22.8  8.0  14.0  23.2  4.6
PRI  12.8  2.7  8.5  12.2  0.9
REF  16.2  12.1  16.1
RRE  4.1  6.5  2.9  4.7  0.8
RUB  25.3  6.3  15.7  24.9  4.1
SHP  2.4  6.5  1.8  2.8  0.5
STO  24.0  5.0  15.7  24.2  3.2
SUG  32.3  80.0  24.3  112.3  80.0
TEX  19.5  10.0  12.6  21.9  5.2
TOB  57.3  30.0  24.3  62.3  30.0
VEG  1.8  15.0  1.4  2.6  0.8
VEH  28.8  6.5  16.6  26.5  4.4
Woo  19.6  5.2  13.3  20.5  2.8
B-13APPENDIK C:
CALIBRATION OF THE MODEL
1. Data Sources
The most important  dataset for our purposes is the 198S  Input-Output  table for Turkey
obtained from the State Planning Organization  of Turkey. Tbis 10 table identifies  the following  64
sectors, listed below with their three-letter  acronym:
AOM  ApWImlmm w4dooy  &  "Mm"ioa
AOl  Api-ulWr
AM  Alf! Uinp-
AM  AW=l  Hmbm*dy
A"P  Wfa.b  qym
WBV  BaR  drid  &  marbuad ~
cm  OUN c'*  -
COL  Cmi mwh
4mm  Cmnm,aImke
WN  Odkt  I  I  A"'
cltu  Crude P  ku  & n11u1  p
010  DuW & medkba
ELS  M  -
PAS  Fabtkimiod  id  pudiac
PM4  Ficdd  hgwdum  a uso
FOO  Foowiaw
I40l  Fcr"u
FN  Wa  wiao&  flxtww
PIT
FMJ  LaPer  afu  tptb
au  M  Pouft  &  "wo
GAS  F  Yu;m  &  IN"  ut,
GIN  C0id  mui  -ab
MiN  imol  e  &  fi
MD  kw  m  mbbkg
Lum  Odaor  - awprt
MAC  machW  mapt  ebc&
MmU  Non-forrou  m1d
we0  Nmnwe  am  MmUS
NFM  Nasowso  mbmI  abbs
OPP  mdcule  d  dbaw foad pmdmctim
OMa  O0ba  _zahoMgb  h&Is
GM?  Olr  -m.bUo  -hadi  podmaam
0l  O-  aI  D_  P  qu 0Tn  Odw  q_pot 
owN  O  ofp  dwmd_h
PA?  Fapar a  par  padawb
PET  Plmza  & cm  podiEb
PU  rProduc
PM  n  enowd  a  padtuuiml  maV
PR[  Prudip  & pbag
PUB  Public ow  m
REF  PatralUwa agbaat
RB'  Rm~aUiwua  ,  haoi.
WLW  Rsi-y  Usprt
-R  Ralkod  q
C-iRUB  Rubber  proda
SHP  Shbkulding  & rpafing
cmD  St"  qmnyin
uow  &Wpr
IEX  Tomcio (Gin.L  gin
lOB  Tobao
TRD  whoinial  & rtell  aSd&
VEo  Vegeibb & ai-;-  oils  & fob
VEHI  Land uwwpod vhkci  &  e  quipmin
WAT  Water hwsport
WOO  Wood & ooik produM
There are a large number of sectors identified  here that are minuscule in terms of their
contribution  to total value added. We elected  to aggregate  24 of these sectors with other sectors, using
our own priors as to which sectors they would  be best aggregated with. The resulting mapping,
indicating  aggregated  sector and sector aggregated  to, is as follows:
CRU  ->  COL Cmdo Peeolem & Iwuuel gp
IRO  ->  COL Iran ore minng
NFO ->  COL N-forms  amng
NMM ->  COL N-mealL;c  mimcl  min
STO - >  COL StW  qTyig
FRU ->  VBO  Pmni & vegetbls pmoming
URN - >  VBG  Omm mil paduts
B8V - >  OFP Soft drinks  & oarbmatd swr
GIN - >  Tl)X Gina
FUR->  APP  L  h  &fur  prducb
POO  ->  APP Footear
FRN  - >  WOO  Wood fure  h  fiures
PAP  - > WOO  Peper  & par  produt
EU ->  COM Printing  & publihin
DRO->  CHM DnsW  &  medici
PET  ->  CHM Petlum  & coal  products
PLS  ->  CHM Phdipro&"dus
NFM ->  IRN Nm-ferrus  mel
AOM ->  MAC AgrVulwl  mbiney  & equipmo
SHP  ->  MAC Sibilding  & rairing
RR8 ->  VEH Raid  equipmem
OT8 ->  VEH Odtr  tupoc  equpmmt
ONO  ->  MAC Other manucri  ing
RLW ->  LND RParly  buuot
Thus we see, for example, that the CRU, IRO, NFO and NMM sectors are all added to the COL
sector in the 40-sector aggregation  used throughout.  Our final aggregation  consists of the following
sectors:
AOl  AgrcAuro
AM  Al  toop
ALC  A  bc&i  bWmge
AM  A-)l  Hutbanry
A"  Woahig  qR.
BSW  °  uldingawden
aM  Ceoam
CND  Othr  0mk  p-
ODL  Cal  minin
WDK  Communictm
CON  Other coaeVtn
ElS  Eectcity
C-2PAR  Fwbriwed mdel produb
FIN  Fimchl  imwMU  A hAmmao
FIB  FVherim
FMR  P  °Or,
FRT  Fetliza
0AS  X  rowfacuo  h&  voWrnC&
OLI  01m  & glzm produa
MEN  Ira  & Ste
LAD  Odr  hnd  emm
bAC  Nydniy  oxept  61*rid
USEA  N~tP-,ioo  gm
OFP  M2N1ufactkr  of oteo  food pmodw
OMP  Other  ni  c1i  mbmi  prducti
OWN  Ownerhs  of dwellio
PPS  Persna  A pro(euiaul  "momo
PUB  Publ  .erviom
REP  Pdtol.m  f'oric'
RES  Remuraw A hotesk
RUII  Rubber produot
PUG  Sulpr
Tint  TexlSr  (oxwl.  gimie)
TOR  Tohcoo
tRD  Whoksle  & regl  tdo
VBG  Voetable & mnim  oils & fob
VBH  LAad  busport  vebicls  h  equipm-a
WAT  Wale btmm
wvo  Wood & cork prowti
2. Elasticities
The text explained  the sources for each of the elasticities  in the model. The specific values
emplotyed  are listed below. ETRN is the elasticity  of transformation  between domestic  & exports.
ESUBKL  is the factor substitution  elasticity. ESUBDD is the product differentiation  substitution
elasticity. ESUBDM  is the domestic-imports  substitution  elasticity. ESUBMM  is the imports-by-
source substitution  elasticity. MU is the price elasticity of the Armington  aggregate.
Ser  81RN  BSUBKL  BSUBDD  E8UBDM  ESUBMM  MU
AOR  2.9Q0  0.945  IO0.OQ  2.000  5.000  2.000
AIR  2.900  1.884  10.OOD  2.000  5.000  2.000
ALC  2.900  0.945  10.000  2t00  5.000  2.000
ANI  2.900  0.945  IO0.0D  2.000  5.000  2.000
APP  2.900  0.927  10.0D  3.400  5.000  2.000
BID  2.900  1.9S8  10.000  2.000  5.000  2.000
CEM  2.90D  0.958  10.000  M.SO0  5.0Q0  2.000
CNM  2.900  l.OQ9  10.000  l.SOO  5.000  2.000
COL  2.9Q0  0.426  10.000  0.500  5.000  2.000
COM  2.900  1.988  10.OQO  2.00  5.000  2.0QO
CON  2.900  1.988  10.000  2.000  5.000  2.000
MEl  2.900  1.884  10.000  2.00  5.000  2.000
EtM  2.900  0.981  10.O0  1.300  5.000  2.0QO
FAB  2.900  0.911  10.000  1.500  5.00  2.000
FIN  2.900  2.055  10.000  2.ODD  5.0S0  2.000
FIS  2.90D  0.945  10.000  2.000  5.000  2.0QO
FOR  2.900  0.945  10.000  2.000  5.000  2.0QO
FRT  2.900  1.009  10.000  1.400  5.000  2.000
OAS  2.900  1.8S4  10.000  2.000  5.000  2.000
OLS  2.900  0.958  10.000  1.400  5.000  2.000
IRN  2900  0.911  10.000  0.500  5.000  2.OD
LND  2.900  1.884  10.000  2.000  5.000  2.00Q
C-3MAC  2.90D  1.202  10.000  0.500  5.000  2.000
MBA  2.90D  0.945  10.O0D  0.5C0  5.000  2.000
OFP  2.900  0.945  10.00D  0.500  5.00  2.000
OMP  2.900  0.958  10.000  0.I00  5.000  2.000
OWN  2.90D  1.988  10.000  2.000  5.00  2.000
PPS  2.900  2.055  10.000  2.OOD  5.000  2.000
PUB  2.900  1.988  10.000  2.C00  5.000  2.00D
RI  low2.40  0.293  10.0C0  0.340  5.000  2.000
RR8S  2.900  3.125  10.000  2.00  5.000  2.000
RUB  2.9C0  0.972  10.000  1.300  5.000  2.000
SUO  2.900  0.945  IO.OC0  2.000  5.000  2.000
TQC  2.900  0.927  10.000  2.000  5.000  2.000
TOB  2.900  0.839  10.000  2.00D  5.000  2.00D
TRD  2.900  1.283  10.000  2.000  5.000  2.000
VBG  2.900  0.945  10.000  1.700  5.000  2.000
VEH  2.900  1.884  10.000  2.000  5.000  2.000
WAT  2.9C0  1.884  10.000  2.00  5.000  2.000
WOO  2.900  0.745  10.lO  2.000  5.000  2.000
C4APPENDIX D:
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS  OF RESULTS
In this appendix  we document the systematic  sensitivity analysis  of our simulation  results. The
statistical  procedures employed  are those developed  by Harrison and Vinod [1992] and implemented  in
the MPSS  software developed  by Harrison [1990]. Essentially  these procedures  amount  to a Monte Carlo
simulation  exercise in which a wide range of elasticities  are independently  and simultaneously  perturbed
from their benchmark  values.  These perturbations  follow  prescribed  distributions,  such as a t distribution
with a specified standard deviation and degrees of freedom, or a uniform distribution over a specified
range. The exact distributional  assumptions  used are documented  below in a file which is used by the
MPSS software to set up the Monte Carlo simulations.  For each Monte Carlo run we solve the counter-
factual  policy with the selected  set of elasticities.  This process is repeated  until we arrive at the desired
sample size, in our case 1000. The results are then tabulated as a distribution, with equal weight being
given (by construction)  to each Monte Carlo run. The upshot is a probability  distribution defined over
the endogenous  variables of interest. In our case we focus solely on the welfare impacts of each policy.
The exact distributional assumptions we used have been described in  the main text.  Exact
documentation  is provided  by the following  "SSA" file, to use the jargon of the software MPSS  described
in Harrison [19901.  In the interests of space we will not explain how to interpret this file. To a large
degree it is reasonably  self-explanatory,  and to the extent that it is not the reader can consult Harrison
[1990] and Harrison and Vinod [1992]. The file is as follows:
SSANPLB:  1000  COMMODITY ... va.BLD
SMPS: upold  mp~O0  COMMODITY ... wLC8M
SMAPMU  NUL  COMMODrIY  ... mLCHM
SSAV&  COMMODrITfY  ... va.COL
SINTBORATl  0  1.073  COMMODITf  ... n.COM
SHISOORAM:  15  COMMODrIY  ... wa.CON
SCINTERVALS: 5D 55 6D  65 70 75 80 85 9D 9510D  COMMODr  OD  ...  w.B.L
SFPRCENT: F/ALB  COMMODrIY  ...  v.IEM
$SCRATCH: D:  COMMODITY ... va.FAB
COMMODIlTY ... u  COMMODITY  ... v.FIN
COMMODIT ... f.L  COMMODIrT  ... w.FIS
COMMODIrY  ... f.K  COMMODITY ... v  w.FOR
COMMODITY  ... .. AOR  COMMODrrY  .... FRT
COMMODITY  ... W.AIR  COMMODITY ... v.GAS
COMMODITY ...  a.A.  C  COMMODITY ... v.aLS
COMMODITY  V"...  NI  COMMODrrY  .... IRN
COMMODrrY  ... Va.APP  COMMODITY ....  w.LND
D-1COMMODIrT  ... vLMAC  COMMODrrY  ... c.FRT
COMMODrlY  ... va.MBA  COMMODrrY  ... c.OAS
COMMODrTY ... vw.OFP  COMMODrTY ... c.OLS
COMMODITY ... w.OMP  COMMODlTY  ... c.IRN
COMMODITY ... Va.OWN  COMMODITY  ... c.LND
COMMODITY ... va.PPS  COMMODITY  ... c.MAC
COMMODITY ...  ..PUB  COMMODITY  ... c.MEA
COMMODITY ... vaw.RF  COMMODIlY  ... c.OFP
COMMODITY ... va.RBS  COMMODITY  ... cOMP
COMMODrfT  ... vw.RUB  COMMODITY  ... c.PPS
COMMODllY  ... va.SUO  COMMODrrY  ... c.RHF
COMMODrTY  v..TEX  COMMODITY  ... c.RBS
COMMODITY  ...  ... TOB  COMMODrrY  ... c.RUB
COMMODITY ... vim.TRD  COMMODITY ... c.SUG
COMMODITY ... va.VEO  COMMODITY ... c.TEC
COMMODrIY  ... va.VEH  COMMODIYf  ... o.TOB
COMMODITY  ...  va.WAT  COMMODITY  ...  c.TRD
COMMODITY  ... vadWOO  COMMODIT  ...  c.VEO
COMMODITY ... go  COMMODITY ... c.VEH
COMMODITY ... fs  COMMODrTf  ... c.WAT
COMMODITY ... nvk  COMMODITY  ... c.WOO
COMMODITY ... aJAR  PRODUCTION ... I  a:  0.000
COMMODITY ... a.AIR  PRODUCllON  ... I  a: 0.0O0
COMMODrIT  ...  a.ALC  PRODUCTION  ...  I  b:  0.000
COMMODITY  ...  a"ANI  PRODUCTION  ... I  c :0.000
COMMODITY  ...  a.APP  PRODUCTION ...  I  d: 0.000
COMMODITY  ...  a.BLD  PRODUCTION ... I  L..0.000
COMMODITY  ...  a.CEYA  PRODUCTION ... Y.AOR  a: 0.000  *  0.0  0.5  1.0
COMMODITY  s...  aCHM  PRODUCTION ...  YAOR  a: 0.000
COMMODITY  ...  a.COL  PRODUCTnON ... YAOR  b:  0.000
COMMODITY  ...  a.COM  PRODUCnON  ...  YAOR  c: 0.000
COMMODITY  ...  a.CON  PRODUCnON  ...  YAOR  .. d O.OD
COMMODITY  ...  LELE.  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.AGR  t: 2.900  n  1.3  5
COMMODITY  ... a....M  PRODUCnON  ... YAMR  a: o.o0o o 0.0  0.5  1.0
COMMODrIY  ... a.FAB  PRODUCTION ...  YAMR  a: 0.000
COMMODITY  ...  a.FIN  PRODUCTION  ...  YAIR  6b: O.O0
COMMODITY  ...  aFIS  PRODUCTION  ... YAMR  c  o.0o0
COMMODrrY  ...  aFOR  PRODUCTION ... Y.AIR  d: 0.000
COMMODITY  ...  aFRT  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.AIR  t.  2.90D  n  1.3  5
COMMODITY  ... aa.UA  PRODUCTION ... YALC  a: 0.000  o 0.0  0.5  1.0
COMMODITY  ... a.OLS  PRODUCnON  ...  YALC  a: O.OD
COMMODITY  ...  aIRN  PRODUCTION  ...  Y-ALC  b:  0.000
COMMODITY  ... a.LND,  PRODUCTION ... Y.ALC  :0.000
COMMODITY  ..  aMAC  PRODUCTION ...  Y.ALC  d: 0.000
COMMODITY  ...  aMeA  PRODUCnON  ...  YALC  t  2.900  a  1.3  5
COMMODITY  ...  a.OFP  PRODUCTION  ...  YJAM  s:  O.DD  a  0.0  0.5  1.0
COMMODITY  ...  aOMP  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.ANI  a: 0.00
COMMODITY  ... a.OWN  PRODUCnON  ...  Y.ANI  b6  0.000
COMMODITi  ...  a.PPS  PRODUCnON  ...  Y.ANI  c:  0.000
COMMODITY  ... a.PUB  UPRoDuCnON  ...  YAM  d. O.0D0
COMMODITY  ...  a.RF  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.ANI  t  2.900  n  1.3  5
COMMODITYr ... LRHS  PRODUCTION ... Y-APP  a: o.o0o a  0.0  0.5  1.0
COMMODrIY  ...  a.RUB  PRODUCTION ...  YAP?  a: 0.000
COMMODITY  ... aSUO  PRODUCTION  ...  YAPP  b: 0.000
COMMODITY  ...  a.TEX  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.APP  : 0.000
COMMODITY  ...  a.TOB  PRODUCION  ...  YAPP  d. 0.000
COMMODITY  ... a.TRD  PRODUCnON  ...  YAP  t  2.900  n  1.3  5
COMMODITY  ...  a.vBO  PRODUCTON  ...  Y.BLD  a: 0.000  a  0.0  0.5  1.0
COMMODITY  ... a.VEH  PRODUCTON  ... Y.BLD  a: 0.000
COMMODrIT  ...  a.WAT  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.BLD  6b:  O.OO
COMMODITY  ...  a.WOO  PRODUCTION ...  Y.BLD  o0.000
COMMODITY  ...  cAUR  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.BLDE  d  0.000
COMMODITY  ...  cAR  PRODUCTON  ... Y.BLUD  .t 2.900  n  1.3  5
COMMODITY  ...  cALC  PRODUCTON  ... Y.CEM  a: 0.OCO  a  0.0  0.5  1.0
COMMODITY  ...  c.ANI  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.CEM[  a: 0.00D
COMMODITY  ...  cAPP  PRODUCTION ... Y.CEM  b: O.O0
COMMODITY  ... c.BLD  PRODUCnON  ...  Y.CEM  c:0.00o
COMMODITY  ...  c.CEM  PRODUCnON  ...  Y.CEM  d. 0.000
COMMODITY  ... c.CHM  PRODUCnON  ... Y.CEM  t  2.9W  n  1.3  5
COMMODITY  ...  .COL  PRODUCTION ... Y.CHM  a: o.00  o  0.0  0.5  1.0
COMMCDITY  ...  .COM  PRODUCTON  ...  Y.CHM  a: 0.00D
COMMODITY  ...  C.ELE  PRODUCTION ...  Y.CHM  b: 0.000
COMMODTY  ..... M  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.CHM  :0.  0oo
COMMODITY  ...  c.FAB  PRODUCTON  ...  Y.CHM  d:  0.000
COMMODITY  ...  c.FIN  PRODUCnON  ...  Y.CHM  Lt 2.900  n  1.3  5
COMMODITY  ...  c.FIS  PRODUCTON  ... Y.COL  a: o.oo0 a  0.0  0.5  1.0
COMMODITY  ...  c.FOR  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.COL  a: 0.000
D-2PRODUCrION ... Y.COL  b:0O.000  PRODUCTION  ... Y.tLND  a:  .000
MRODUCTION  ...  YTCOL  c: 0.000  PRODUCnION  ...  Y.  LND  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.COL  d. 0.000  MRODUCrION  ...  Y.IND  c: 0.00)
MRODUCTION  ... Y.COL  L-  2.900  a  1.3 5  PRODUCTON  .. Y.LND  d: 0.000
RODUCTION  ... Y.Com  a: 0.000  a  0.0  0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION  .. Y.LND  t: 2.900  1.3  5
MRODUCTION  ...  Y.COM  a: 0.000  PRODUCrION ... Y.MAC  a:O  000  a.0  0.5  1.0
MRODUCTION  ...  Y.COM  b: 0.000  PRtODUCTnON  ...  Y.MAC  8:.000
MRODUCrION  ... Y.COM  c:0.000  PRODUCTION  ... Y.MAC  b: 0.000
PRODUCrION ...  Y.COM4  d: 0.000  PRODUCrION ... Y.N(AC  c: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... Y.COM  t.-  2.900  n  1.3 S  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.MAC  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.CON  s: 0.000  0.0 0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION  ...  YTMAC  L  2.900  1.3 5
PRODUCTION  ... Y.CON  a: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... Y.IAEA  0.000a  0.0 0.5  1.0
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.CON  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.MBA  a:0.000
MRODUCTION  ...  Y.CON  c: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.MEA  b: 0.000
MRODUCrION  ...  Y.CON  d.- 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.MEA  0:  0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.CON  Lt 2.900  a1.3  5  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.MEA  d: 0.00)
PRODUCTION  ... Y.EL.B  a: 0.000  0.0 0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION  ... Y.MHA  t: 2.900D  1.3 5
PRODUCTION  ... Y.MZ  a: 0.000  PPODUCTION  ...  Y.OFP  a: 0.000  0.0 0.5  1.0
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.EMZ  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.OFP  a: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.LE8  0:  0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.OFP  b: 0.00)
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.ELH  d: 0.00)  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.OFP  c: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.ELH  L~  2.900  1.3 5  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.OFP  d: 0.00
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.ELM  a:  .000  0.0 0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION  ... Y.OFP  t  2.900  1.3 S
PRODUCTION  ... Y.ELM  a  0.000  PRODUCTION  ... Y.OM~P  a: 0.000  0.0 0.5  1.0
PRODUCTION  .. Y.FLM  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... Y.OM?  a: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.ELM  C: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.OMP'  b: 0.000
MRODUCTION  ...  Y.WLM  d: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  YTO?  0: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.EIJM  t:  2.900  n  1.3 5  PRODUCTION  ...  YTOM?P  d: 0.00)
PRODUCTION  ... Y.FAB  a:0,000  a0.0  0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION  ... T.OMP  L  2.900) n  1.3 S
PRODUCTION  ... Y.PAB  a:0.000  PRODUCTION  ... Y.OWN  a:0.000  a 0.0  0.5  1.0
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.FAE  b:0O.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.OWN  a:0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.FAB  c- 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  T.OWN  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.FAB  d: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.OWN  0: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.FAB  t.  2.900  a1.3  5  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.OWN  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... Y.PIN  a: 0.000  0.0 0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.OWN  t., 2.900  n  1.3 S
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.FIN  a: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... Y.PPS  a  0.000 a  0.0 0.5  1.0
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.FIN  b:0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.PPS  a:0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  '(FIN  0:  0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.PPS  b:0.00D0
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.FIN  d. 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.PPS  c: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.FIN  :2.900  n  1.3 5  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.PPS  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... Y.FIS  OA:  0.0  0.0 0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION  ... Y.PPS  tw-  2.900  n  1.3 5
PRODUCTION  ... Y.FIS  80.000  PRODUCTION  ... Y.PUB  a  0.00)  a  0.0 0.5  1.0
PRODUCTION  ...  T.PIS  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.PUB  a:  .000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.FIS  a: 0.000  PRODUCrION  ...  Y.PUB  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.FIS  d. 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.PUS  0: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.PIS  Lt 2.900  n  1.3 5  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.PUB  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... Y.FOR  a- 0.000 s  0.0 0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.PUB  t: 2.900  n  1.3 S
PRODUCTION  ... Y.FOR  a: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... YTREF  s: 0.000 a  0.0  0.5  1.0
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.FOR  b: 0.000  PRODUCrION  ...  Y.RIIF  a: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.FOR  0: 0.000D  PRODUCTION  ...  T.REP  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.FOR  d.~  0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.REF  0:0O.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y-FOR  t. 2.900  a  1.3 5  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.REF  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... Y.FRT  a:  .000 a  0.0 0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION  ... T.REF  t~ 2.900  n  1.3 5
PRODUCTION  ... Y.FRT  a:0.000  PRODUCrION ... Y.RSS  a: 0.000  0.0 0.5  1.0
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.FRT  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.RES  a: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.FRT  c: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  YTRES  b:0.000D
MRODUCTION  ...  Y.FRT  d.~  0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.RES  c:0.000D
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.FRT  t.  2.900  n  1.3 5  PRODUCTION  ...  YARES  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... YOM  A  : 0.000  0.0  0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION  ... Y.RES  t.:  2.900D  1.3 5
PRODUCTION  ... YTOM  a:  .000  PRODUCTION  ... Y.RUB  a: 0.000a  0.0 0.5  1.0
PRODUCTION  ...  T.OM  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.RUB  a: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  TOGA  c:0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  T.RUB  b: 0.000
PRODVCTION  ...  T.OA  d: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.RUB  0:0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.OAS  t:  2.900  n1.3  5  PRODUCTION  ...  T.RUE  d:0O.000
PRODUCTION  ... YOQU  a: 0.000  0.0 0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION  ... T.RUE  t  2.900  n  1.3 S
PRODUCTION  ...  YOUI  a: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... Y.SUO  a 0.000 a 0.0 0.5  1.0
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.OU  b: 0.000  PRODUMTON ...  Y.SUO  a:0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.OLS  c:0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.SUO  b: 0.000
PRODUCrION  ...  Y.OL  d: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.SUO  c: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.OIJ  t  2.900  1.3 5  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.SUO  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... YlIRN  a 0.000a  0.0 0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.SUO  t: 2.900  a  1.3 S
PRODUCTION  ... Y.IRN  a  .000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.TEX  8:.000  0.0  0.5  1.0
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.IRN  6: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  T.TEX  a:0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  TIlRN  c:0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.THX  b:0.000D
PRODUCTION  ...  T.IRN  d.~  0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.TEX  c:0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.IRN  Lt 2.90D  1.3  5  PRODUCTION  ...  Y.TEX  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.LND)  8:  0.000  0.0 0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION  ... Y.TMX  t  2.900D  1.3 5
D-3PRODUCrION  ...  Y.TOB  s:  O.ODO  s  0.0 0.5  1.0  PRODUCnON  ...  V.CEM  v.e  0.000
PRODUCrION  ...  Y.TOH  a.'  0.00D  PRODUCTION  ... V.CHM  *:1.010  a  .0268 5
PRODUCTION ...  Y.TOD  b: 0.00  PRODUCTION ...  V.CHM  8:0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.TOB  c:0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.CHM  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION ...  Y.T08  .d.  0.0J0  PRODUCTION ...  V.CHM  a.  o.0o0
PRODUCTION  ... Y.TB  2.900  n  1.3 5  .RODUCTION  ..  V.CHM  d: 0000
PRODUCnON  ...  Y.TRD,  A:.00  0.0  0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION ...  V.CH4M  t  0.000
PRODUCTION ....  Y  .TRD  0.000  PODUCTION  ...  V.COL  0:  430  n  .105  5
PRODUCTION ...  Y.TRD  b:  0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.COL  a:  0.00
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.T9D  a:  0.000  PMODUCTION  ...  V.COL  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.TRD  d. 0.0J0  PRODUCTION ...  V.COL  c: 0.000
PRODUCtION  ...  Y.TRD  e  2.90D  a  1.3 5  PRODUCTION ... V.COL  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION ...  Y.VBO  0.000 oa 0.0  0.S  1.0  PRODUCTION ... V.COL  t. 0.00
PRODUCTION ... Y.VEO  8:0.000  PRODUCTION ... V.COM  : 1.990  n .477 5
PRODUCTION ...  Y.VO  b: O.AO  PRODUCTION ...  V,COM  a: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.VEO  0:0.000  PRODUCTION ...  V.COM  b: O.OD
PRODUCTION ...  Y.VBG  d: 0.000  PRODUCTION ... V.COM  c: 0.000
PRODUCTION ...  Y.VBO  L' 2.0D0  a  1.3  5  PRODUCTON  ... V.COM  d:0.0D0
PRODUCTION ...  Y.VEH  0.000 a 0.0  0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION ...  V.COM e.  0.000
PRODUCTION ...  cVEH  0.000  PRODUCTION ...  V.CON  :  1.990 n  .477  5
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.VEH  b: 0.00  PRODUCnON ...  V.CON  :0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.VBH  c: 0.000  PRODUCTION ...  V.CON  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.VBH  d: 0.000  PRODUCTION  .. V.CON  c: 0.000
PRODUCTION ...  Y.VEH  e 2.900  n  1.3 5  PRODUCTION  ...  V.CON  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION ...  Y.WAT  : 0.000  0.0 0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION  ...  V.CON  e 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.WAT  0:0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.LB  :  1.80L  n  .249  5
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.WAT  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... V.1L8  a:  0.0D0
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.WAT  c:  0.00  PRODUCnON  ...  V.ELB  b: O.O
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.WAT  d: 0.000  PRODUCTION ...  V.eLB  c:  0.00
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.WAT  u 2.900  a  1.3 5  PRODUCTION  ...  V.BL  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION ...  Y.WOO  :0.000  a 0.0 0.5  1.0  PRODUCTION ...  V.BLB  O.W
PRODUCTION ...  Y.WOO  a 0.0D0  PRODUCTION ...  V.EIM  s:  o0.980  n  .0267 5
PRODUCTION  ... Y.WOO  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION ...  V.BLM  a: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  Y.WOO  0:  0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.ELM  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION ...  Y.WOO  d: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.ELM  c:  0.000
PRODUCrION ... Y.WOO  e  2.9S  D  1.3  5  PRODUCTION ...  V.EL  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION ...  V.AOR  a:  0.940  a 0.041  5  PRODUC1ION ... V.ELM  t.e  0.000
PRODUCTION ...  VAOR  a.:  0.0D0  PRODUCTION ... V.FAB  a: 0.910  D .2411  s
PRODUCTION ...  VAOR  b: O.  PRODUCTION ...  V.FAB  a  0.0D0
PRODUCTION  ...  V.AOR  0: O.0o  PRODUCnON  ...  V.FAB  b:  0.0D0
PRODUCTION ...  V.AUR  d:  0.00W  PRODUCTION ...  V.FAB  ca  0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.AUR  :  0.000  PRODUCnON  ...  V.FAB  d.  0.000
PRODUCTION ...  VAUtR  a: I.880  n  .2489  5  PRODUCTION ...  V.FAB  t:.e  OD0
PRODUCnON ... V.AIR  a: 0.O0  PRODUCTION ... V.FIN  a:  2.050  .255 5
PRODUCTION ... VAIR  b:  0.00  PRODUCTION ... V.FIN  a:  0.0D0
PRODUCnON  ... VAIR  c: 0.000  PRODUCTION ... V.FIN  b:  0.0D0
PRODUCnON ...  VAIR  d:  0.000  PRODUCnON  ...  V.FIN  0:  0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.AIR  U.  0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.FIN  d.' 0.000
PRODUCTION ...  V.ALC  s: 0.0  n  .041 5  PRODUCTION  ...  V.FIN  e  0.0D0
PRODUCTION ...  V.ALC  a.:  O.O0  PRODUCTION ...  V.FIS  a:  0.940  n .0407  5
PRODUCTION  ...  VALC  b:  0.000  PRODUCTION ....  V.IS  a: 0.0D0
PRODUCTION  ... V.ALC  0.:  0.0o  PRODUCTION ... V.IS  b:  0.000
PRODUCION  ...  VALC  .d  0.000  PRODUCTION ...  V.FI  0:  0.000
PRODUCnON  ...  V.ALC  e0.0D0  PRODUCTION  ...  V.XS  d 0.00D0
PRODUCrION  ... V.ANI  8:0.940 n  .041  5  PRODUCTION ... V.eS  U O.0D0
PRODUCTION ... V.ANM  .a  0.0D0  PRODUCTION ...  V.OR  a: 0.940  n .04015
PRODUCTION ...  V.ANI  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION ...  V.FOR  a:  0.000
PRODUCTION ... VAN[  c: 0.0J0  PRODUCTION ...  V.FOR  b:  0.000
PRODUCTION ...  VANI  d.  d0.000  PRODUCnON  ...  V.FOR  a: 0.0D0
PRODUCIO0N ...  VANI  U 0.000  PRODUCnON  ...  V.OR  d: O.WO
PRODUCTION ... VAPP  s: 0.930  n  .0766  5  PRODUCnON  ... V.FOR  e  0.0D0
PRODUCTION  ...  V.APP  a:  0.000  PRODUCrION ... V.FRT  .: 1.010  n  .0268  s
PRODUCrION ...  V.APP  b: 0.000  PRODUCnON  ...  V.8RT  a:  0.000
PRODUCTION ...  VAPP  c: 0.0oo  PRODUCTION ... V.FRT  b:  0.000
PRODUCTION  ... V.APP  d: O.WO0  PRODUCTION  ... V.FRT  e:  0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.APP  :  e0.W0  PRODUCTION  ...  V.FRT  d. 0.000
PRODUCnON ...  V.8LD,  s:  :90  .477 5  PRODUCIION  ...  V.FRT  U 0.000
PRODUCTION ... V.BLD  a: 0.000  PRODUCTION ... V.0AS  a: LsD  n  .2489  5
PRODUCTION ... V.BLD  6b:  o.0o  PRODUCrION  ...  VCAS  a: 0.000
PRODUCrION ... V.8B.1)  c: 0.00D  PRODUCTION ...  VbAS  b0.000
PRODUCTION ... V.BUD  d: 0.000  PRODUCTION ... VOAS  c: 0.000
PRODUCllON  ... V.BLD  u 0.0oo  PRODUCTION ... VOAS  d  0.000
PRODUCTION ... V.CEM  s: 0.960  n  .1317  5  PRODUCTION ... V.OAS  0.'  Q000
PRODUClION  ... V.CEM  a: 0.000  PRODUClION  ... V.*.  :0.960  a  .1317  5
PRODUCTION ... V.CEM  :  0.AD  PRODUCnION ... V.ULS  .a:  0.0
PRODUCTION ... V.CEM  c: 0.000  PRODUCIION ...  V.01.  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION ...  V.CEM  d. 0.000  PRODUCTION ...  V.01.8  c: O.000
D4PRODUCrION ...  V.OL.  d. 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.SUO  0: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... V.01t8  !: 0.000  MODUCrION  ... V.SUO  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... V.IRN  0: 0.910  a  .2411  5  PRODUCTION  ...  V.SUO  L' 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... V.tRN  a: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... V.TEX  a: 0.930  a.0766  5
PRODUCTION  ...  V.IRN  b: 0.000  MODUCTION  ...  V.THX  a: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.IRN  c: 0.000  MRODUCTION  ...  V.T9C  6: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.IRN  d. 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.THX  c: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.IRN  t: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.TSX  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... V.LND  e: 1.880  a.2489  5  MRODUCTION  ...  V.TEX  t: 0.000
PRODUCrION ...  V.tNT)  a: 0.000  MRODUCTION  ... V.TOD  a:O.W4  .0893 5
PRODUCTION  ...  V.LND  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.TOB  80.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.LND  w:0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.TOB  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.LND  d. 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.TOB  0:  0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.LND  L' 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.TOB  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.MAC  a: 1.200  n  .0897 S  PRODUCTION  ...  V.TOB  L~  0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.MAC  a: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.TRD)  s:1.29D  n  .525 S
PRODUCTION  ...  V.MAC  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.TRD,  a: 0.00
PRODUCTION  ...  V.M(AC  0:0O.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.TRD  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V3.MAC  d: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.TRD  0: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.MAC  t: 0.00  PRODUCTION  ...  V.TRD  d. 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.MEA  a: 0.900a  .0407 5  PRODUCTION  ...  V.TRD  L,  0.000
PRODUCTION  ... V.WlEA  a: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.VEG  a: 0.940  n  .0407 5
PRODUCTION  ...  VAMEA  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.VBO  a; 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.MEA  o: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.VBO  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.MB  d.~  0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.VEO  0:  0.000
PRODUCrION ... V.ME3A  t- 0.000  PPOI)ULCTION  ... V.VEO  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... V.OFP  o: 0.940a  .0407 5  PRODUC'TION  ... V.VUO  L,  0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.OFP  a: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.VEIH  :1.880  3  .2489 5
PRODUCTION  ...  V.OFP  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.VHH  0:.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.OFP  0:0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.VEH  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... V.OFP  d.,  0.000  PRODUCTnON  ... V.VElI  c:0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.OFP  L' 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.V89H  d. 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... V.O0l  a:  0.9E0a  .1317 5  PRODUCTION  ... V.VEH  L,  0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.OMP  a:0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.WAT  s: 1.880  n  .2489 5
PRODUCTION  ...  V.0Wl  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.WAT  a: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.0MP  0:0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.WAT  b6:0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.0Wl  d: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.WAT  c, 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.0Wf  t  0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.WAT  d.  0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.OWN  a. 1.090  a.477  5  PRODUCTION  ...  V.WAT  u. 0.000
PRODULTION  ...  V.OWN  a: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.WOO  8: 0.740  a  .1136 5
PRODUCTION  ...  V.OWN  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.WOO  a: 0.000
PRODUCnION  ...  V.OVWN  c: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  V.WO0  6: 0.000
PRODUCrION ...  V.OWN  d&  0.000  PRODUCnION  ...  V.WO0  a- 0.000
PRODucTIoN  ...  V.OWN  t~ 0.000  PRODUCnION  ...  V.WOO  d. 0.000
PRODUCnION  ... V.PPS  s: 2.050  n  .255 5  PRODUCTION  ... V.WOO  L' 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... V.PPS  a: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... A.AOR  8:  2.000  m .5.75 1.0 1.25  1.5
PRODUCTION  ... V.PPS  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... A.AOR  8:5.000  a  3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
PRODUCTION  ...  V.PPS  0:0O.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.AOR  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.M9  . 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.AOR  0:  0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.PPS  O  .000  PRODUCrION ...  A.AOR  d. 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... V.PUB  a  1.990  a  .477  5  PRODUCTION  ... A.AOR  L,  0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.PUB  a. 0.00  PRODUCTION  ... A-MIR  s: 2.000  m .5 .75 1.0  1.25 1.5
PRODUCTION  ...  V.PUB  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... A.AI  a: 5.000  *  3.0  4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
PRODUCTION  ...  V.PUB  0:.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.AI  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.PUB  &  .000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.AI  a: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.PUB  u  0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.AI  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.RE  a: 0.290  a.1016  5  PRODUCTION  ... A.AIR  t: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.R89P  a. 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... A.AL  8:  2.100  m .5 .75 1.0 1.25  1.5
PRODUCTION  ...  V.REP  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... A.AL  a: 5.000  a  3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
PRODUCrION ...  V.RF  0:  0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.AL  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.RF  L' 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.AW  0:0.00DD
PRODUCTION  ...  V.REF  t. 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.AL  d. 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... V.RBS  s: 3.12D  .817 5  PRODUCTION  ... A.ALC  t: 0.000
PRODUCrION ... V.RBS  a: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... AAN  s: 2.000  m .5.75  1.0  1.25 1.5
PRODUCTION  ... V.RES  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... A.AN  a: 5.000  a  3.0  4.0 5.0  6.0 7.0
PRODUCTION  ...  V.RBS  a. 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.AN  b:0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  VASS  d.' 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.AN  c: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.RES  t: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.AN  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.RUB  a: 0.970  n  .082 5  PRODUCTION  ... A.AN  t  0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.RUB  a: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... A.AP  s: 3.400  m .5.75  1.0  1.25 1.5
PRODUCTION  ...  V.RUB  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.AP  a:'  5.000  a  3.0  4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
PRODUCTION  ...  V.RUB  c0  0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A-APP  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  V.RUB  d: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.APP  c:0.000D
PRODUCTION  ...  V.RUB  t: 0.000  PRODUCrION  ...  A-APP  d: 0.000
PRODUCnION  ... V.SUO  e: 0.940  a  .0407 S  PRODUCTION  ... A"AP  t. 0.000
PMODUCTION  ... V.SU0  a: 0.000  PRODUCIION ... A.BL.1  a: 2.ODD m .5.75  1.0  1.25 1.5
PRODUCTION  ...  V.SUO  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... A.DLD  a: 5.000  s  3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
D-5PRODUCION  ...  A.BLD)  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... A.OLS  i:  5.000  a  3.0  4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
PRODUCTION  ...  A.BLD  c: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.OLS.  b: 0.000
PRODUCnON  ...  A.BLD  d. 0.00D0  PRODUCnON  ...  A.GOLS  0:0.000
PRODUCTION ...  A.BLD  Le  0.000  PRODUCTION  ... A.OLS  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... A.CES4  a: 0.800  m .5 .75 1.0 1.25  1.5  PRODUCTION  ... A.OLS  t: 0.000
PRODUCTION ... C.  A  :CBM  a 5.000  a  3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0  PRODUCnON ...  ArIRN  a: 0.5D0  m  .5 .73 1.01.25  1.5
PRODUCTION ...  A.CBM  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.IRN  a: 5.000  a  3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
PRODUCTION  ...  A.CM  c:0. c00D  PRODUCnON  ...  A.IRN  b: 0.000
PRODUCnON  ...  A.CEMW  d 0.000  PRODUCnON  ...  A.IRN  0: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  A.CEM  .. e  Q0.00  PRODUCTION  ...  A.IRN  d: 0.00D0
PRODUCnON ...  A.CHM  s:  1L.O00  m  .5 .75  1.0 1.25  1.5  PRODUCTION  ...  A.IRN  U;  O.ODO
PRODUCTON  ...  A.CHM  a: 5.000 a  3.0 4.0  5.0  6.0 7.0  PRODUCnON  ...  A.LND  a: 2.000  m  .5 .75  1.0 1.25 1.5
PRODUCnON ...  A.CHM  b: 0.000  PRODUCnON ...  A.LND  a: 5.0DO a  3.0  4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
PRODUCTION  ...  A.CHM  .0  eooo  PRODUCnON  ...  A.LND  1b:  0.000
PRODUCrION  ...  A.CNM  d.  0.000  PRODUCnON  ...  A.LND  c: 0.030
PRODUCTION  ...  A.CHM  : e0.030  PRODUCnON ... A.LND  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  A.COL  .:  0.500  im .5.75  1.01.25 1.3  PRODUCnON ...  A.LND  e.. 0.00D
PRODUCnON  ...  A.COL  &: 5.000 a  3.0 4.0 5.0  6.0 7.0  PRODUCnON ...  A.MAC  a: 0.500  m  .5 .75 1.0 1.25  1.5
PRODUCnON ...  A.COL  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... A.MAC  a: 5.0DO  a  3.0 4.0 5.0  6.0 7.0
PRODUCTION  ...  A.COL  c: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... A.MAC  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  A.COL  &. 0.00D  PRODUCTION  ...  A.MAC  c: O.OD0
PRODUCTON  ...  A.COL  t. 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.MAC  d: 0.000
PRODUCTON  ...  A.COM  a: 2.00D  D  .5 .75 1.0 1.25  1.5  PRODUCTON  ...  A.MAC  1: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  A.COM  a: 5.00D a  3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0  PRODUCTION  ... A.MEA  s: 0.530  m  .5 .75 1.0 1.25  1.5
PRODUCTION ...  A.COM  b: O.ODO  PRODUCTION  ... A.MEA  a: 5.000 a  3.0 4.0 5.0  6.0 7.0
PRODUCTION  ...  A.COM  0:0.000  PRODUCnON  ...  A.MEA  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  A.COM  &. 0.030  PRODUCTION  ... A.MEA  c: O.OD
PRODUCnON  ...  A.COM  e  0.000  PRODUCT7ON  ...  A.MEA  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  A.BLB  s: 2.00D  m  .5.75 1.01.25 1.5  PRODUCTION  ...  A.M1A  t: 0.000
PRIODUCTON  ...  AL.BL  a: 5.000  a  3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0  PRODUCnON  ...  A.OFP  a: 0.530  m .5  .75 1.0 1.25 1.5
PRODUCnON  ...  A.ELB  b: 0.000  PRODUCnON  ...  A.OFP  a: 5.000 a  3.0 4.0 5.0  6.0 7.0
PRODUCTON ...  A.B.ELB  :0.0DO  PRODUCTION  ... A.OFP  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... A.HEL  d: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... A.OFP  :c  O.ODO
PRODUCnON ...  A.eZB  t. 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.OFP  d: 0.000
PRODUCnON ...  A.BLM  a: 1.30D  m  .5 .75 1.01.25 1.5  PRODUCnON ...  A.OFP  Ut  O.ODO
PRODUCnON ...  A.ELM  a: 5.000  s  3.0 4.0 5.0  6.0 7.0  PRODUCTION ...  A.OMP  s: 0.800  m .5 .75 1.0 1.25  1.5
PRODUCnON ... A.ELM  b:  .000  PRODUCTnON  ...  AOMP  a: 5.000  s  3.0 4.0 5.0  6.0 7.0
PRODUCTION  ... A.ELM  c: 0.000  PRODUCnON  ...  A.OMP  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  A.ELM  d. 0.000  PRODUCnON .... OMP  A.  c: 0.00
PRODUCTON  ...  A.ELM  O0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.OMP  d: O.OD0
PRODUCTION  ...  A.FAB  g: 1.5D  m  .5 .75  1.01.25 1.5  PRODUCTION ...  A.OMP  t. O.OD
PRODUCTON  ...  A.FAB  a: 3.O0  s  3.0  4.0 5.0  6.0 7.0  PRODUCTON ...  A.PPS  8: 2.000  m  .5 .75 1.01.25 1.5
PRODUCTION ...  AFABS  b: 0.O00  MODUCnON  ... A.PPS  a: 5.00D  a  3.0 4.0 5.0  6.0 7.0
PRODUCTION  ...  A.AS  :  :0.00D  PRODUCTION  ...  A.PPS  b: 0.00D
PRODUCnON  ...  A  FABH  d: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... A.PPS  c: 0.000
PRODUCTON  ...  A.FAB  te O.ODO  PRODUC  PON  ...  A.PPS  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ... A.FIN  a: 2.OD0 in  .5.75  1.0 1.25  1.5  PRODUCTION  ... A.PPS  e  0.00D
PRODUCTION  ...  A.FIN  a: 5.000  s  3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0  PRODUCnON ...  A.ReF  a: 0.340  m .5 .75  1.01.25  1.5
PRODUCnON  ...  A.FIN  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... A.REF  a:  .000  s  3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
PRODUCTON  ...  A.FIN  e  0.030  PRODUCTION  ...  A.REF  b: O.OD0
PRODUCTION  ...  AXFIN  d: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ... A.REF  c: O.ODO
PRODUCTION  ...  A.FIN  L 0.00D  PRODUCTION  ... A.REF  d: 0.00D
PRODUCTION  ...  A.FIS  a: 2.O00  m .5 .751.01.25 1.5  PRODUCTION  ...  A.REF  e  0.000
PRODUCTON  ...  A.PIS  a: 5.000 a  3.0 4.0  5.0 6.0 7.0  PRODUCnON ... A.RES  a: 2.000  m .5 .75 1.01.23 1.S
PRODUCTON  ...  AFIS  b: O.O0  PRODUCTION  ... A.RES  a: 3.000  s  3.0 4.0 5.0  6.0 7.0
PRODUCTION  ...  A.FIS  c: o.0o  PRODUCTION ...  A.RES  b: 0.000
PRODUCnON  ...  A.FIS  d: O.O0  PRODUCTION  ...  A.RES  : 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  A-FIS  L, 0.000  PRODUCllON  ...  A.RES  d: O.ODO
PRODUCnON  ...  A.FOR  s:  2.000  m . .75 1.0  1.25 1.3  PRODUCTION  ... A.RES  t. 0.030
PRODUCTON  ...  A.FOR  a: 3.000  s  3.0 4.0  5.0  6.0 7.0  PRODUCnON  ...  A.RUB  a: 1.300 m .5  .7  1.01.25 1.3
PRODUCnON  ...  A.FOR  b: 0.00  PRODUCTON  ... A.RUB  a: 53.000  3.0 4.0 3.0 6.0 7.0
PRODUCnON ...  A.FOR  0:0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.RUB  b: 0.00
PRODUCnON ...  A.FOR  &. O.O0  PRODUCTION  ... A.RUB  c: 0.000
PRODuCnON ...  A.FOR  1:.  0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.RUB  d: 0.000
PRODUCTION ...  A.FRT  a:.400  A  .5.73  1.01  25 1.3  PRODUCnON  ... A.RUB  te 0.00
PRODUCnON ...  A.FRT  a: 5.000  a  3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0  MODUCnTON  ...  A.SUO  m:  2.000  m .S .75 1.0 1.25 1.5
PRODUCnON  ...  A.FRT  b: 0.000  PRODUCTION  ...  A.SUO  a: 5.O0  a  3.0 4.0 3.0 6.0 7.0
PRODUCnol  ...  A.FRT  c: 0.000  PRODUCnON  ...  A.SUO  b: 0.000
PRODUCTON  ...  A.FRT  d  0.000  PRODUCTON ...  A.SUG  e  :  O  .OD:
PRODUCnON  ...  A.FRT  te O:.0  PRODUCTON ...  A.SUO  d: O.OQ
PRODUCnON  ...  A.AS  s  : 2.OO  m .3 .7 1.0 1.25 1.5  PRODUCTION  ... A.SUO  1 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  A.oAS  a: 5.0o0  a  3.0 4.0 3.0  6.0  7.0  PRODUCnON  ...  A.TEX  a: 2.000  m .5 .75 1.0 1.25 1.5
PRODUCTnON  ...  A.ous  b: 0.000  PRODUCTON ... A.TEX  a: 5.000 s  3.0 4.0 5.0  6.0  7.0
PRODUCON  ...  A.oAS  0:0.000  PRODUCTON ...  A.TEX  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  A.oAS  d. 0.000  PRuDUCTION ...  A.TEX  : 0.000
PRODUCTION ...  A.GAS  e:0000  PRODUCnON ... A.TEX  d: 0.000
PRODUCMON  ...  A.LOLS  s  1.400  m .3 .73  1.0 1.25 1.5  PRODUCTnON  ...  A.TTK  e  0.000
D-6PRODUCnON  ...  A.TOB  s: 2.00  m .5 .75 1.0 1.25 1.5
PRODUCnON  ... A.TOB  a: 5.00  a  3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
PRODUCTION  ...  A.TOB  b: O.ODO
PRODUCnON  ... A.TOB  c: O.ODO
PRODUCnON  ...  A.TOB  d:  O.OD
PRODUCnON  ...  A.TOB  t  O.OD
PRODUCnON  ...  A.TRD  *:  2.000  m .5 .75 1.0 1.25 1.5
PRODUCnON  ...  A.TRD  a: 5.000  a  3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
PRODUCnON  ...  A.TRD  b: 0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  A.TRD  c:  O.O0
PRODUCION  ... A.TRD  d.  O.000
PRODUCnON ...  ATRD  c O.OD
PRODUCnON ...  A.VEG  : 1.70  m .5 .751.01.25  1.5
PRODUCTON  ... A.VE  5.000  a  3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
PRODUCnON ...  A.VBO  b: O.OD
PRODUCnON ...  A.VEB  c:  O.OD0
PRODUCTION  ...  A.VBO  d 0.000
PRODUCnON ...  A.VEO  Le  0.000
PRODUCTION ...  A.VEH  a: 2.000  m .5 .75 1.01.25  1.5
PRODUCTION  ... AVEH  a: 5.0D  a  3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
PRODUCnON  ...  A.VEH  b:  O.OD
PRODUCnON  ...  A.VEH  c:  O.O0
PRODUCnON  ... A.VEH  d:  O.O0
PRODUCnON  ...  A.VEH  c O.O0
PRODUCnON  ...  A.WAT  a: 2.00D mS  .75 1.01.25  1.5
PRODUCnON ... A.WAT  a: 5.O0  a  3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
PRODUCTION  ...  A.WAT  b: o.o0
PRODUCnON  ...  A.WAT  c:  O.OD
PRODUCnON  ...  A.WAT  & O.OD
PRODUCnON  ...  A.WAT  t  0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  A.WOO  s: 2.00  m .5 .75 1.0 1.25 1.5
PRODUCTION  ... AWOO  : 5.00D  a  3.0 4.0 5.0  6.0 7.0
PRODUCTION  ...  A.WOO  b:  O.0D0
PRODUCnON ...  A.WOO  a: O.O0
PRODUCnON ...  A.WOO  d. 0.00
PRODUCnON ...  A.WOO  c 0.000
PRODUCnON  "  U  .:  1.OD0 a  0.0  0.5  1.0  1.5 2.0
PRODUCnoN  ... u  0.000
PRODUCnON  ... U  b:  O.o00
PRODUCTION ... U  c:  0.000
PRODUCTION  ...  U  d  0.000
PRODUCnON  ...  U  t  O.O0
PRODUCnON  ...  0  O.0D0
PRODUCnON  ... 0  a0.00D
PRODUCnON  ... 0  b:  0.O0
PRODUCnON  ...  c:0O.O00
PRODUCTnON  ... 0  d O.ODD
PRODUCnON  ...  0  t  O.DD
DEMAND  ...  REPA0T  a:O.00
DEMAND  ...  REPAaT  r  0.000
DEMAND  ...  REPAGT  b: O.0D0
DEMAND  ...  REPAOT  c:  0.00D
DEMAND  ...  REPAFT  d:  O.DD
DEMAND  ...  COVT  .:0.000
DEMAND  .OVT  &.:  O.
DEMAND  ...  OOVT  b: 0.000
DEMAND  ...  OOVT  c:  0.00D
DEMAND  ...  GOVT  d. 0.000
AUXIARY  ...  bulo
AUXILARY  ...  uwq
There is one specific assumption  built into this sensitivity analysis that is not obvious from the
cited documentation  and this file. Government  demands a good called G, which is produced using a
number  of inputs (which are final goods and services produced by other activities).  The point estimate
elasticity of substitution for this activity is zero, implying a Leontief production technology. This is
shown above, near the end of the SSA file, by the line "PRODUCTION  ...  G  s: 0.000". We would
D-7normally perturb such an elasticity  by allowing  it to also take on values of 0.5, 1.0, 1.5 and 2.0, as well
as zero. Unfortunately  we cannot do this here, since some of the input coefficients  are negative. This is
due to government  expenditure  including  current consumption  and investment  together; the latter can be
negative if, for example, the government runs down it's  inventories in a good sufficiently  in the base
year. In any event, these negative  coefficients  imply that we are constrained  to use a non-price-responsive
production  technology for this activity, since the derived input demands  are not well-defined  in such a
case if they are price-sensitive. In other words, we are constrained by the economics of this set of
benchmark  expenditure  data to not perturb this elasticity  away from zero. Thus there are no distributional
assumptions  made for this line in the SSA file.
The results of the sensitivity analysis  are reported in Section 5 of the main text.
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